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While attorneys as a rule faithfully observe and fearlessly dis-
charge [their ethical] duties and obligations regardless of the effect
that their actions in these respects may have on their own personal
interests, yet experience has demonstrated that there are exceptions
to the general rule, and that there are members of the legal profes-
sion who, when their own personal interests are involved in an action
or proceeding in which they are acting as counsel, are apt to, and
sometimes do, disregard these general duties which the law imposes
upon them. Therefore, in order to prevent attorneys from having an
undue interest in litigation in which they are employed as counsel,
(Vol. 37:933
ATTORNEYS AS BAIL BONDSMEN
they are prohibited in this and many other jurisdictions either by
statute or rule of court from becoming surety for their clients.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Stephanie sat behind the plate glass window in the attorney-cli-
ent meeting rooms of the county jail with a white face mask cover-
ing her nose and mouth, standard procedure for recent detainees,
crying hysterically, angrily poking at the air, repeatedly demanding
an answer to the same question of her criminal defense attorney:
"Why did you do this to me? I did everything you asked me to!" It
was then we realized that our client, whom we were representing in
an ancillary civil matter, had been betrayed by her criminal defense
attorney, the implications of which we would not know until later.
Our client was charged with a criminal offense and subsequently
released on bond, which her criminal defense attorney posted. The
day before her plea bargain conference her criminal defense attor-
ney jumped off her bond after nearly two years of being out on
bond and surrendered her back into the custody of the Bexar
County Jail. The events that transpired after that incident were
predictable, including our client taking a plea on her criminal
charges, and it begs the question: Would the outcome have been
the same if her bail bondsman had been anyone other than her
criminal defense attorney?
Prior to that experience, we were not aware that Texas permitted
attorneys, by statute, to be bail bondsmen for their clients. Conse-
quently, we researched this issue and realized that Texas was, when
it comes to allowing attorneys to be bondsmen for their clients, an
anomaly. Our research led us to a recent American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA) Formal Opinion, which strongly discourages the prac-
tice of attorneys as bondsmen. Ultimately, we felt compelled to
write this Article to explore the troublesome aspects of the con-
flicts that arise when a criminal defense attorney acts as his client's
bail bondsman.
While our experiences dealt with an attorney who posted bond
for his criminal defense client, the same ethical dilemmas can be
encountered in posting a bond for a client in civil matters such as
probate, family law, and appeals. This Article focuses primarily on
1. McWhirter v. Donaldson, 104 P. 731, 735 (Utah 1909).
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the issue of posting bail in a criminal matter, while drawing corol-
laries to posting bonds in civil matters. In Part II, we discuss the
history of bail, dating from pre-Norman England to the present
day. Part III explores the bail system in Texas. Part IV discusses
the attorney exemption in the Texas Bail Bond Act, codified in the
Occupations Code. Part V provides a survey of the statutes and
ethics opinions of other jurisdictions. Part VI reviews Texas ethics
opinions addressing attorneys and the practice of bail bonding.
Part VII provides an in-depth analysis of the risks associated with
acting as a lawyer-bondsman under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct. Part VIII discusses remedies available to a
client if her bondsman has inappropriately "jumped off" her bond.
Lastly, Part IX offers a recommendation to solve the dilemma of
conflict arising in this manner.
II. HISTORY OF BAIL
The concept of bail can be traced to before the Norman Con-
quest of 1066.2 The factors that determined who qualified for re-
lease on bail were inconsistent and consequently applied unevenly
to similarly situated defendants until bail became codified in En-
gland in 1275 through the Statute of Westminster.3 The American
colonists brought the concept of bail to the New World, including a
requirement that the bail set could not be excessive, which had
originally been established in the English Bill of Rights in 1689.4
When the forefathers drafted the Constitution of the United States,
2. See Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 YALE L.J. 966, 966 (1961) (stating
that "[tihe modern institution of release on bail pending trial has evolved from a practice
which goes back at least to Pre-Norman England").
3. See Joseph Buro, Bail-Defining Sufficient Sureties: The Constitutionality of Cash-
Only Bail, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1407, 1411 (2004) (noting that the "common law system was
littered with corruption and inconsistent application") (citing June Carbone, Seeing
Through the Emperor's New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic Principles in the Administration
of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 523 (1983)).
4. See Peggy M. Tobolowsky & James F. Quinn, Pretrial Release in the 1990s: Texas
Takes Another Look at Nonfinancial Release Conditions, 19 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 267, 271 (1993) (examining some of the colonial methods of determining
bail issues). There is some evidence to suggest that the American concept of excessive bail
was established before the English Bill of Rights. Compare Bail: An Ancient Practice Re-
examined, 70 YALE L.J. 966, 967 n.12 (1961) (referencing the English system's right against
excessive bail to the 1689 English Bill of Rights), with Baik An Ancient Practice Reexam-
ined, 70 YALE L.J. 966, 967 n.13 (1961) ("The first American proscription against excessive
bail antedates the English Bill of Rights.").
[Vol. 37:933
ATTORNEYS AS BAIL BONDSMEN
they included an amendment that prohibited the imposition of ex-
cessive bail while not explicitly guaranteeing a right to bail.5 The
purpose of bail was "to ensure that the accused would reappear on
the date set for his trial."'6 When a third party, or surety, posted
bail, the third party assumed the responsibility and guaranteed the
defendant's appearance at trial, risking the forfeiture of personal
property.7 The determination to release an accused was based
largely on the offense with which the accused was charged, includ-
ing consideration of the nature and seriousness of the crime.' The
third party who assumed responsibility for the presence of the ac-
cused at trial, assumed the powers of a jailer and was given the
same authority as law enforcement officials to recapture the ac-
cused and bring her to trial.9 This ability by the surety to bring the
accused to trial was reflective of an immobile society and did not
lend itself to a fluid society with a seemingly endless border, as was
encountered in America. 10 In time, the personal surety system was
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also Wagner v. United States, 250 F.2d 804, 805 (9th
Cir. 1957) (stating that the Constitution provides that bail shall not be excessive, not "that
every defendant is entitled to bail"); Nail v. Slayton, 353 F. Supp. 1013, 1019 (W.D. Va.
1972) (stating that neither the Eighth nor Fourteenth Amendment requires that every de-
fendant be released on bail pending trial). But see Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 556
(1952) (Black, J., dissenting) (suggesting that proscription against excessive bail assumes an
absolute right to bail that only Congress can grant or deny). Although there is no constitu-
tional right to bail on the federal level, many states adopted the concept of a right to bail in
their state constitutions, thereby providing a constitutional right to bail in some instances
in that particular jurisdiction. Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Note, The Eighth Amendment and
the Right to Bail: Historical Perspectives, 82 COLUM. L REV. 328, 351 (1982) (discussing
states that include an absolute right to bail in their constitutions).
6. Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 YALE L.J. 966, 966 (1961).
7. Id.
8. Peggy M. Tobolowsky & James F. Quinn, Pretrial Release in the 1990s: Texas Takes
Another Look at Nonfinancial Release Conditons, 19 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CON-
FINEMENT 267, 273-74 (1993).
9. See Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 YALE L.J. 966, 967 (1961) (referenc-
ing the actions a responsible party was allowed to take in connection to controlling the
accused).
10. See id. (discussing the efficacy of personal surety in a land-based, immobile soci-
ety); see also Joseph Buro, Bail-Defining Sufficient Sureties: The Constitutionality of
Cash-Only Bail, 35 RurTGERS L.J. 1407, 1411 (2004) (explaining that "the dramatic expan-
sion of the colonial population and the seemingly limitless frontier beyond the colonies'
borders provoked some necessary alterations to the way the system had traditionally func-
tioned"). An individual's ties to his local community became increasingly attenuated; most
colonists were, by nature, new to their communities and arrived with limited or nonexistent
connections to their fellow citizens. These factors made it difficult for a sheriff to "judge
the trustworthiness of sureties and defendants based on personal knowledge." Id. at 1413
2006]
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replaced by a commercial one, wherein the surety took financial
responsibility for the accused's presence for a fee and, in exchange,
risked forfeiture of the security interest if she did not appear.11
Essentially, this shift made posting bond a business where both
risk and profitability could be evaluated to determine whether a
surety should post the bond. Each state has policies and proce-
dures in place to regulate bail bondsmen and to allow its citizens to
enjoy their liberty while awaiting trial.
III. THE BAIL SYSTEM IN TEXAS
Following the example of many other states, Texas, in 1836, in-
corporated a right to bail in its first state Constitution. 12 A corol-
lary was also established in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,
roughly twenty years later, wherein a right to bail, for certain of-
fenses, primarily non-capital, was codified. 13 According to the stat-
ute, an accused could be released either on a recognizance, which
was an "unsigned 'undertaking' in a fixed sum by a defendant and
his sureties"' 4 and the precursor to the personal bond, or through a
bail bond defined as:
A bond given to a court by a criminal defendant's surety to guaran-
tee that the defendant will duly appear in court in the future and, if
the defendant is jailed, to obtain the defendant's release from con-
finement. The effect of the release on bail bond is to transfer cus-
tody of the defendant from the officers of the law to the custody of
the surety on the bail bond, whose undertaking is to redeliver the
n.34; see also Peggy M. Tobolowsky & James F. Quinn, Pretrial Release in the 1990s: Texas
Takes Another Look at Nonfinancial Release Conditons, 19 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 267, 274 n.38 (1993) (listing the shortcomings of the personal surety system
in America).
11. See Peggy M. Tobolowsky & James F. Quinn, Pretrial Release in the 1990s: Texas
Takes Another Look at Nonfinancial Release Conditons, 19 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 267, 274 (1993) (illustrating the shift from personal sureties to commercial
bondsmen).
12. REPUB. TEX. CONST. of 1836, Declaration of Rights, reprinted in 1 H.P.N. GAM-
MEL, THE LAWS OF TEXAS 1822-1897, at 1083 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898).
13. See Peggy M. Tobolowsky & James F. Quinn, Pretrial Release in the 1990s: Texas
Takes Another Look at Nonfinancial Release Conditons, 19 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 267, 300 (1993) (indicating that Texas's first Code of Criminal Procedure
established a "bail system" in 1856).
14. Id.
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defendant to legal custody at the time and place appointed in the
bond.
15
Currently, Texas allows a defendant who is eligible for bond to
be released from jail and await trial: (1) on her own recognizance,
which does not require any financial obligation if she fails to ap-
pear for future hearings; (2) by posting a personal bond, where the
defendant must pay a determined amount of money if she does not
appear for future hearings; (3) by posting a refundable cash bond
for the full amount of the bond; or (4) by obtaining the services of
a commercial surety who will post the bond for a nonrefundable
fee.16 If a defendant chooses to employ a commercial surety, she
must pay a nonrefundable fee, or a premium, which is a percentage
of the amount set by the court as bond.17 The surety then becomes
responsible for ensuring the accused appears at all future hearings,
thereby taking on the responsibilities conferred upon law enforce-
ment officials.1 8 In essence, the state subcontracts its duties to the
surety, thereby establishing a contract between the surety and the
state with the end goal being that the surety will guarantee the ac-
cused's presence at trial. 19
If the accused does not appear for a criminal hearing, she be-
comes in default on the bond and the state can pursue a judgment
nisi, the judicial mechanism by which a bond is forfeited.2 0  At
15. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 187 (8th ed. 2004).
16. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.01-.09 (Vernon 2005). Only one of these
options may be available to a defendant at any one given time. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen.
No. JC-0215 (2000) (opining that a split bond, where part of the bond is satisfied through a
personal bond with a remainder amount due through a surety, is not allowed).
17. Stephanie's bond was set at $75,000 and her attorney set the corresponding bond
fee at $7500. See Letter from Stephanie Smith, client, to Donna Bloom, co-author (Dec.
13, 2005) (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal) (providing details of her experience as a
criminal defendant client with an attorney also acting as her bail bondsman). See generally
GREATER SAN ANTONIO SOUTHWESTERN BELL YELLOW PAGES 305-18, § BAIL BONDS
(2005) (offering some bond fees at rates as low as 2% to 5%). There is, however, no
regulatory limit set on the fee that may be imposed.
18. See Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366, 371 (1872) (listing the enforcement powers of
the bondsman); see also Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 YALE L.J. 966, 967
(1961).
19. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JC-0121 (1999) (opining that "a bail bond is a con-
tract in which the surety has an interest and to which the county is a party").
20. See Watkins v. State, 16 Tex. Ct. App. 646, 647 (1884) (stating that a judgment nisi
is the avenue for bond forfeiture, and prescribing the process and procedure pursuant to
the Code of Criminal Procedure); Burgemeister v. Anderson, 113 Tex. 495, 259 S.W. 1078,
1078-79 (1924) (reiterating the procedure to obtain a judgment nisi).
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common law, if an accused failed to appear, the bondsman was au-
thorized to seize her and surrender her to authorities, virtually
granting unlimited authority to recapture the accused-and many
jurisdictions still follow the common law approach.21
In an effort to regulate the actions of bail bondsmen, and pre-
sumably to ensure that defendants are afforded some due process
prior to being recaptured, the Texas legislature departed from the
common law concept and enacted statutes that require judicial ac-
tion to authorize the recapture of the defendant.22 If a surety
wants to surrender the accused, she must first notify the accused's
attorney by providing notice as authorized in Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 21(a) and then file an affidavit of the intent to surrender
the accused with the court in which the criminal action is pending.2 3
When reviewing the affidavit, the court, upon a finding that cause
exists for the surety to surrender the principal, will issue "a warrant
21. See Taintor, 83 U.S. at 371. The Supreme Court explained the privileges of a
surety by stating that:
When bail is given, the principal is regarded as delivered to the custody of his sureties.
Their dominion is a continuance of the original imprisonment. Whenever they choose
to do so, they may seize him and deliver him up in their discharge; and if that cannot
be done at once, they may imprison him until it can be done. They may exercise their
rights in person or by agent. They may pursue him into another State; may arrest him
on the Sabbath; and, if necessary, may break and enter his house for that purpose.
The seizure is not made by virtue of new process. None is needed. It is likened to the
rearrest by the sheriff of an escaping prisoner.
Id.; see also Shifflett v. State, 572 A.2d 167, 169 (Md. 1990) (explaining that state rules
conferring rights and responsibilities of bail bonds officers do not override the bondsman's
common law right to recapture defendant prior to forfeiture of the bond); Hudson v. State,
375 P.2d 164, 166 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962) (proclaiming that sureties can recapture their
principal and even imprison them if the surety deems it necessary); 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bail
and Recognizance § 80 (Supp. 2005) (stating that "[b]y entering into a bond agreement...
the principal voluntarily consent[s] to be[ing] committed to the custody of the surety, but
also implicitly agrees that the surety or the surety's agent may break and enter his home
and use reasonable force in apprehending him") (citing State v. Mathis, 349 N.C. 503
(1998)).
22. See Green v. State, 829 S.W.2d 222, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (holding that
Taylor "is not the law in Texas," and that "[s]tatutory guidelines have replaced the com-
mon law in Texas and define the law as it applies to sureties who seek to apprehend
principles").
23. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.19(a) (Vernon 2005); see also Austin v.
State, 541 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (concluding that a bondsman whose
principal was unwilling to voluntarily comply with the bondsman's request that the princi-
pal surrender to the sheriff had no right to use force to compel the principal to do so and
that the bondsman's only remedy was to seek a warrant of arrest from the court).
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of arrest or capias" for the capture of the principal. 24 The statute
refers to the necessity for the court to find cause, but does not
specify whether there must be "good" cause or "reasonable" cause.
If the principal challenges the surrender, the statutorily defined
standard of review will be "reasonable cause," thereby placing a
greater burden on the surety in a contest hearing.25 As to the no-
tice requirement, the statute does not address what notice, if any, is
due to the client if her attorney is also her bail bondsman. Presum-
ably, the attorney would have to inform his client that he is in-
tending to "jump off" the bond, but there is no specific statutory
requirement to that effect.
In a further effort to exert some control over the commercial
surety industry, the legislature enacted a law which requires com-
mercial sureties to secure a license and imposes certain regulatory
requirements.26 The only exception to the licensing requirement is
if the bondsman is an attorney licensed to practice law in the state
of Texas.27
IV. THE ATTORNEY EXEMPTION
A. The Statute and Its Purpose
In Texas, an attorney is exempt from the requirements of licen-
sure as a bondsman, including the requirement to maintain a par-
ticular level of security to underwrite the bonds.28 Nonetheless, the
attorney is still required to conform to the other requirements reg-
ulating the practice of bondsmen and can be disqualified from serv-
ing as a bondsman if those requirements are violated.29 The
attorney exemption statute provides:
24. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.19(b) (Vernon 2005).
25. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1704.207(b) (Vernon 2004).
26. Id. § 1704.160.
27. See id. § 1704.151 (requiring a license for commercial sureties); § 1704.163
(Vernon Supp. 2005) (providing an exemption of the licensing requirements for attorneys
who are also the attorney of record for the defendant/principal).
28. Id. § 1704.163 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
29. See id. § 1704.163(b) (providing that an attorney acting as a surety under the attor-
ney exemption may not engage in conduct involved with that practice that would subject a
bail bond surety to license suspension or revocation.); § 1704.252(1)-(16) (Vernon 2004)
(listing instructions where board may suspend or revoke license); see also Op. Tex. Att'y
Gen. No. GA-0197 (2004) (opining that an attorney who acts as a surety under section
1704.163 of the Texas Occupational Code is not subject to the licensing and security re-
quirements, unlike a non-attorney licensed bail bondsman). "Section 1704.163 exempts an
2006]
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(a) Except as provided by this section, a person not licensed under
this chapter may execute a bail bond or act as a surety for another
person in any county in this state if the person:
(1) is licensed to practice law in this state; and
(2) at the time the bond is executed or the person acts as a surety,
files a notice of appearance as counsel of record in the criminal
case for which the bond was executed or surety provided or sub-
mits proof that the person has previously filed with the court in
which the criminal case is pending the notice of appearance as
counsel of record.
(b) A person executing a bail bond or acting as a surety under this
section may not engage in conduct involved with that practice that
would subject a bail bond surety to license suspension or revocation.
If the board determines that a person has violated this subsection,
the board may suspend or revoke the person's authorization to post
a bond under this section or may bar the person from executing a
bail bond or acting as a surety under this section until the person has
remedied the violation.
(c) A person executing a bail bond or acting as a surety under this
section is not relieved of liability on the bond solely because the per-
son is later replaced as attorney of record in the criminal case.
30
This statute was most recently amended by the Regular Session
of the 79th Legislature.3' The amendment included a requirement
that the attorney file a notice of appearance as counsel with the
court, suggesting that the attorney must prove he is representing
the defendant in the underlying criminal proceeding.32 Whereas
before, by not mandating any filings with the court, the statute pre-
attorney from the chapter 1704 license and security requirements .... For that reason, the
bases for license suspension and revocation that involve license or security requirement
violations do not apply to an attorney who acts as a surety under section 1704.163." Id.
That same opinion does not, however, absolve the attorney's duty to adhere to the remain-
ing requirements of a licensed bondsman. See TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 1704.252(1)-(16)
(Vernon 2004) (providing examples of behavior which could disqualify the attorney from
acting as a bondsman); see also Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JC-0277 (2000) (concluding that
the court must inquire into the sufficiency of the security offered by a surety, including a
criminal defense attorney who is acting as surety on a client's bond). Article 17.11 Section
1 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that surety will be deemed sufficient if
"such surety is worth at least double the amount of the sum for which he is bound... that
he is a resident of this state, and has property therein." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
17.11(1) (Vernon 2005).
30. TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 1704.163 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
31. Act of September 1, 2005, 79th Leg., ch. 316, § 3, 2005 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 938,
939 (Vernon) (to be codified as an amendment of TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 1704.163).
32. Id.
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sumed the attorney would in good faith comply with that require-
ment.33 The requirements imposed on attorneys are substantially
more lenient than those imposed on non-attorney bail bondsmen
and arguably do not provide the same level of professional stan-
dards within that industry.34 The statute also created local adminis-
trative boards, vesting them with authority to grant licenses and
ensure compliance with licensing and surety requirements, as well
as to discipline those in violation of the requirements. 35 While at-
torneys acting in the dual role of attorney and bail bondsman are
exempt from many of the licensing and surety requirements, they
are still subject to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct for representation purposes.
36
B. Legislative History and Intent
The attorney exemption was introduced as part of Senate Bill
(S.B.) 383 in the 63rd Legislature in 1973 and was passed as an
amendment to the Bail Bond Licensing Act, originally passed in
1959. 37 The legislature recognized that attorneys had been posting
bonds and wanted to ensure that attorneys would also be regulated
33. Compare TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 1704.163(a)(2) (Vernon 2004) (suggesting that
the exemption only applies to an attorney who "represents the other person in the criminal
case"), with id. § 1704.163(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2005) (amending the statute to require an
attorney to file "a notice of appearance as counsel of record in the criminal case.").
34. See TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 1704.152 (Vernon Supp. 2005) (requiring a nonlaw-
yer individual seeking a license as a bail bond surety to have in the two years prior to filing
an application at least one year of continuous work experience in the bail bond business
and to complete "at least eight hours of continuing legal education in criminal law courses
or bail bond law courses" in order to be eligible for such licensure). Attorneys are exempt
from these requirements. Id. § 1704.163; see also Cindy V. Culp, Waco Attorney Arrested in
Kidnapping, WACO TRIBUNE-HERALD, Jan. 13, 2006, at 1A (explaining why and how a
Waco attorney who was also serving as her client's bail bondsman abducted her client from
his wedding reception as a result of his failure to appear in court). In this matter, the Waco
Police Department spokesperson explained that when the attorney handcuffed her client
she was committing the criminal act of unlawful restraint. Id. Perhaps this is a topic that is
covered in training provided and required of non-attorney bail bondsman.
35. See TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. §§ 1704.051-.150 (Vernon 2004) (outlining the process
mandated by the legislature concerning the regulation of bail bonds).
36. See Comm. on Interpretation of the Tex. Code of Prof'1 Responsibility, State Bar
of Tex., Op. 388 (1977) (asserting that an attorney who is also his client's bondsman is still
subject to the rules of professional conduct because the attorney has taken on "the respon-
sibilities imposed by him through the attorney client relationship").
37. Act of May 18, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 550, § 3(b), 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1520,
1521. The bill was introduced as Senate Bill 383 and sponsored by Senator Tati Santies-
teban of El Paso, Texas. S.J. OF TEX., 63d Leg., R.S. 951 (1973).
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with respect to the licensing and practice requirements of bail
bondsmen.38 During the Senate hearings on S.B. 383, two senators
inquired as to the appropriateness of attorneys acting as bondsmen
for their clients and suggested that the bill contain an amendment
prohibiting attorneys from serving as bondsmen.39 The sponsor of
the bill cautioned against doing so, considering that there may be
attorneys in small counties without bail bondsmen whose clients
would otherwise not have access to being released from jail to
await trial.40 Further, the bill's sponsor and a witness both believed
that if a prohibition were added to the bill excluding attorneys
from making bonds, the entire bill would fail.41 There was no fur-
ther discussion of the attorney exemption in the 1973 legislature
and the bill ultimately passed by a vote of twenty-six in favor, three
opposed, and one abstention.42 The attorney exemption read as
follows:
(b) Persons who are actually engaged in the practice of law and
who are members of the State Bar of Texas who personally execute
38. See Regulation of Bail Bond Sureties: Hearings on Tex. S.B. 383 Before the Senate
Comm. on Jurisprudence, 63d Leg., R.S. 4-5 (Mar. 20, 1973) (containing a discussion be-
tween Senator Jim Wallace and Mr. Altus Day, bail bondsman) (on file with the St. Mary's
Law Journal).
39. Regulation of Bail Bond Sureties: Hearings on Tex. S.B. 383 Before the Senate
Comm. on Jurisprudence, 63d Leg., R.S. 6-7 (Mar. 20, 1973) (on file with the St. Mary's
Law Journal). Senator Bob Gammage asked the witnesses who were testifying in favor of
the bill what they thought about adding an amendment prohibiting attorneys from making
bonds. Id. at 6. Similarly, Senator Bill Meir wanted the subcommittee to consider amend-
ing the bill to prohibit attorneys from making bonds so that it would fall in line with the
federal system prohibition, adding his concern that "I think it's impossible to avoid a con-
flict where an attorney's representing a client and is also on his bond." Id. at 8.
40. Id. at 8 (containing a discussion between Senator Tati Santiesteban and Senators
Meir, Gammage and Ogg) (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal).
41. Id. Senator Tati Santiesteban, though not opposed to the suggestion of prohibit-
ing attorneys from making bonds, and saying that the legislature had "been toying with
that for seven years now," did feel that by doing so, the measure would fail. Id. "Now, if
we were to put a ... provision prohibiting lawyers from writing bonds then I would be for
it, but I don't think... it would pass, because of what I said." Id. Concurring with Senator
Santiesteban, Mr. Horace G. Cook, a bail bondsman from Houston, testified in favor of the
bill, but was opposed to attorneys making bonds; he stated he would favor an amendment
prohibiting attorneys from making bonds, but added, "I just don't think they'll get it
passed. We've been trying for years and years. If you put it in front of this committee I
think the bill will get amended on the floor. That's my experience over the years." See id.
at 9 (suggesting that a bill that included an amendment prohibiting attorneys from making
bonds would itself be amended, presumably to exclude that prohibition).
42. S.J. OF TEX., 63d Leg., R.S. 958 (1973).
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bail bonds or act as sureties for persons they actually represent in
criminal cases may execute bail bonds or sureties without being li-
censed under this Act, but they are prohibited from engaging in the
practices made the basis for revocation of license under this Act and,
if found guilty of violating the terms of this Act, may not qualify
thereafter under the exception provided in this subsection.43
In 1981 the legislature again addressed the issue of bail bond
licensing, which included revisiting the attorney exemption during
the Regular Session of the 67th Texas Legislature. 4 The measure
was introduced as S.B. 727 by Senator Tati Santiesteban.45 This
time, however, there were two separate bills filed both in the
House and Senate which would prohibit attorneys or public offi-
cials and employees from licensure as bail bondsmen.46 The Senate
hearings on S.B. 727 were short and did not address any substan-
43. Act of May 18, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 550, §1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1520.
44. Act of June 1, 1981, 67th Leg., R.S., ch. 312, 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 875.
45. Tex. S.B. 727, As Introduced, 67th Leg., R.S. (1981). The portion of the proposed
bill that addressed the attorney exemption read as follows:
(f) Persons licensed to practice law in this state may make bonds only;
(1) for persons who will be represented by the attorney on the charge they are
bonded out on;
(2) when he has not written bonds in excess of ten times his net worth as shown in a
financial statement filed with the sheriff in the county where the attorney resides;
(3) when he has posted a security deposit equal to all outstanding judgment nisis
with the County Bail Bond board; and
(4) when he qualifies as a surety under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Id.
46. See Tex. S.B. 128, As Introduced, 67th Leg., R.S. (1981) (detailing the bill intro-
duced by Senator Mauzy, one of the three Senators who had voted against Senate Bill 383
in 1973, which ultimately created the attorney exemption); Tex. H.B. 368, As Introduced,
67th Leg., R.S. (1981) (describing the bill filed by Representative Schlueter as an identical
companion to Senate Bill 128). Section 3(b) of Senate Bill 128 stated:
No individual shall be eligible for a license under this Act who is an attorney licensed
to practice law and who is either engaged in the practice of law or who is associated
with an individual, firm or professional corporation engaged in the practice of law, nor
shall any individual be eligible for a license under this Act who is either an elected
public official or an employee of a state or local unit of government.
Id. Senate Bill 128 was set aside at the Senate level, and no hearings or discussions were
held on it; rather, it was sent to a subcommittee where it never made it out. See Tex. S.B.
128, 67th Leg., R.S., Master Bill History Report, 761 (1981) (outlining the history of the bill
in the Senate). Conversely, the House took up H.B. 368, the House companion bill of S.B.
128, and held hearings on the bill. See Regulation of Bail Bond Sureties: Hearings on Tex.
H.B. 368 Before the House Comm. on Criminal Jurisprudence, 67th Leg., R.S. 7 (Feb. 11,
1981) (noting that the House of Representatives held hearings on Bill 368).
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tive issues regarding the attorney exemption.47 Instead, the Senate
left most of the hearings and discussion to the House. The House
first addressed House Bill (H.B.) 368 and heard testimony from
Kelly Loving, a representative of the Dallas District Attorney's Of-
fice who supported passage of the bill.48 Throughout his testimony,
Mr. Loving repeatedly cautioned about the inherent conflict of in-
terests that could arise when an attorney serves as his client's bail
bondsman.49 Mr. Loving fielded questions primarily from Repre-
sentative Hendricks, the chairperson of the House Criminal Juris-
prudence Committee, who did not feel that a conflict of interest
exists when an attorney serves as a bail bondsman for his client. °
47. See generally Regulation of Bail Bond Sureties: Hearings on Tex. S.B. 727 Before
the Senate Comm. on Jurisprudence, 67th Leg., R.S. (Apr. 21, 1981) (discussing no substan-
tive issue when adopting the subcommittee's reports on S.B. 727). The attorney exemption
passed at the Senate level read as follows:
(e) Persons licensed to practice law in this state may execute bail bonds or act as
sureties for persons they actually represent in criminal cases without being licensed
under this Act but they are prohibited from engaging in the practices made the basis
for revocation of license under this Act and if found by the sheriff to have violated any
term of this Act, may not qualify thereafter under the exception provided in this sub-
section unless and until he comes into compliance with those practices made the basis
for revocation under this Act.
S.J. OF TEX., 67th Leg., R.S. 1166 (1981).
48. Regulation of Bail Bond Sureties: Hearings on Tex. H.B. 368 Before the House
Comm. on Criminal Jurisprudence, 67th Leg., R.S. 4 (Feb. 11, 1981).
49. See id. at 4-7 (reiterating the conflicts of interest that arise when an attorney
serves a client in two different capacities). During a part of his testimony, Mr. Loving had
the following to say about attorneys as bail bondsmen:
One, I personally feel like attorneys ought not be writing bonds in most of the cases
and I personally feel like that a defense attorney himself writes bonds, he is going to
develop a conflict of interest that does not serve the defendant very well and does not
serve the legal profession very well. And that's a part of this bill. I personally strongly
support that. I think - I think we see an erosion of the representation. It doesn't
effect [sic] us. We don't see it in the D.A.'s Office. We don't see what goes on. We're
almost immune from even observing it. But getting away from my position there and
getting involved a little bit. Talking to people, talking to defense attorneys and so on,
I believe that's an erosion there that we ought to eliminate.
Id. at 4-5. During another part of his testimony, Mr. Loving contrasted the role of an
attorney with that of a bondsman by stating that the "responsibilities of a defense attorney
in trying to defend his client are considerably different than the bondsman whose only
interest is putting that person in court and going after and chasing him down if he isn't in
court, finding him, and dragging him back." Id. at 6.
50. See Regulation of Bail Bond Sureties: Hearings on Tex. H.B. 368 Before the House
Comm. on Criminal Jurisprudence, 67th Leg., R.S. 4-7 (Feb. 11, 1981) (noting Representa-
tive Hendricks's responses to Mr. Loving's questions). Representative Hendricks re-
sponded to Mr. Loving's question of "do you feel that these conflicts do not develop
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The hearings eventually ended with no further action taken on
H.B. 368.51 However, S.B. 727 passed in both the House and, sub-
sequently, the Senate. 52 Although mentioned in subsequent legis-
lative hearings, the attorney exception, later referred to as
exemption, received no substantive testimony; in fact, the excep-
tion has undergone only two minor changes since 1981.53 The cur-
rent attorney exemption, in substance, reflects the measures taken
in 1973 and 1981.
between a defense attorney and his client?" by saying, "No, no, sir. I do not believe that
they do." Id. at 6. Similarly, Mr. Loving expressed a concern that an attorney's role is
separate from a bondsman's role because the bondsman's primary concern is to get the
"person in court on time, having this person do whatever he's supposed to do to ensure
that the bondsman does not get stuck on the bond." Id. at 5. Representative Hendricks
responded by asking, "And that's bad?" Id. A few exchanges later, Representative Hen-
dricks reiterated "Where-where is the conflict? I don't see the conflict." Id.
51. See Tex. H.B. 368, 67th Leg., R.S., Master Bill History Report, 85 (1981) (illustrat-
ing that H.B. 368 was sent to the subcommittee on February 11, 1981 and did not return to
the floor of the House); see also Tex. S.B. 128, 67th Leg., R.S., Master Bill History Report,
761 (1981) (noting that S.B. 128 was also referred to a subcommittee that it never left).
52. See H.J. OF TEX., 67th Leg., R.S. 3645-46 (1981) (reporting on the House of Rep-
resentative's passage of S.B. 727); S.J. OF TEX., 67th Leg., R.S. 1167 (1981) (reporting on
the Senate's passage of S.B. 727).
53. See Act of May 27, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1262, § 7, sec. 1704.163, 2001 Tex.
Gen. Laws 2996, 2999 (pointing out the changes made to the section). The 2001 section of
the attorney exemption provided as follows:
(a) Except as provided by this section, a person not licensed under this chapter may
execute a bail bond or act as a surety for another person in any county in this state if
the person:
(1) is licensed to practice law in this state; and
(2) represents the other person in the criminal case for which the bond was given.
(b) A person executing a bail bond or acting as a surety under this section may not
engage in conduct involved with that practice that would subject a bail bond surety to
license suspension or revocation. If the board determines that a person has violated
this subsection, the person may not execute a bail bond or act as a surety under this
section until the person has remedied the violation.
(c) A person executing a bail bond or acting as a surety under this section who has
been paid a fee for executing the bond or acting as the surety is not relieved of liability
on the bond solely because the person has not been employed to represent the princi-
pal on the merits of the criminal case.
Id. (emphasis added to denote changes made by the legislature in 2001); see also Act of
June 17, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 316, § 3, sec. 1704.163, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 938, 939
(amending the statute to include a provision that the attorney acting as surety must file "a
notice of appearance as counsel of record in the criminal case for which the bond was
executed" and clarifying the authority of the local county bail bond board to suspend or
revoke the attorney's authorization to act as surety under this exemption).
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V. SURVEY OF STATUTES AND ETHICS OPINIONS OF
OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The prevailing view across the nation is that it is improper for an
attorney to act as his client's bondsman. 4 This is exhibited through
either statutes enacted prohibiting the behavior or ethics opinions
that similarly interpret the rules of professional conduct.55 The
ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) serve as the
basis for many states' rules of professional conduct. Recently, the
ABA released a formal ethics opinion which, although not estab-
lishing a per se prohibition against lawyers posting bond for their
clients, engaged in a comprehensive analysis of the ethical concerns
that may arise when that practice is employed, and concluded that
the practice is fraught with ethical pitfalls.56
A. The American Bar Association Speaks
1. ABA Ethics Opinion
ABA formal opinion 432 discusses the MRPC, specifically
whether a lawyer who posts bail for his client violates Rules 1.7 and
1.8.51 Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules addresses conflict of interest
with current clients and states:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent
a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of inter-
est. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to an-
other client; or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal
interest of the lawyer.
54. See generally Deborah Markowitz, The Attorney's Query: May a Lawyer Ethically
Post a Bond or Serve As a Surety on Behalf of a Client?, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 959,
959-60 (2005) (acknowledging the ABA Ethics Committee's disapproval of a lawyer acting
as a surety for his client).
55. See id. at 961 (classifying into two categories a states' prohibition of lawyers post-
ing bond for a client).
56. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-432 (2004)
(considering "the ethical concerns that arise under the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct when a lawyer posts, or arranges for the posting of, a bond").
57. See id. (discussing the effects of a lawyer posting bail for a client with regards to
Rules 1.7 and 1.8 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
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(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest
under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to
provide competent and diligent representation to each affected
client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by
one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the
same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in
writing.58
In analyzing Model Rule 1.7(a)(2), the ABA identified that an
attorney who posts bail for his client has a "personal interest in
avoiding financial loss," thereby calling into question the "signifi-
cant risk" and "materially limited" aspects of the rule.59 Further,
the ABA argued that "unless the amount at risk is inconsequential
to the lawyer, there will be a significant risk that this personal in-
terest will materially limit her ability to exercise her independent
professional judgment on the client's behalf."6 The opinion con-
cludes that in these situations a lawyer, more often than not, would
be "prohibited from continuing the representation by Rule
1.7(a)."61 The ABA addresses the second part of the rule, which
provides an exception to the conflict of interest and focuses on the
fourth consideration-the client's informed written consent to the
representation. The ABA concludes that clients who seek bail
from jail are probably not in a position to give informed consent,
and:
In all but the rarest of circumstances, however, the stress and anxiety
of confinement and the other pressures and conditions affecting the
incarcerated client make it highly unlikely that the client's acquies-
cence in the conflict, even if obtained, will qualify as sufficiently gen-
uine and voluntary in nature so as to constitute the sort of "informed
consent" contemplated by Rule 1.7(b).62
Conversely, the ABA found certain circumstances in which an
attorney could post bail for his client without violating the letter or
58. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2003).
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spirit of the rule. Such circumstances exist when the client is a rela-
tive or close friend of the attorney or the bond amount is so negli-
gible that it is of little significance to the attorney.63 In both
circumstances, the ABA determined that a lawyer could "reasona-
bly conclude that her personal interest will not materially limit her
representation of the client. '6 4 While the ABA was careful not to
imply that those possible circumstances are exhaustive, it carved
out very limited exceptions.
The ABA then considered Rule 1.8, particularly subsection (e),
and whether the posting of bond is considered an "inappropriate
provision of financial assistance to the client in connection with
pending or contemplated litigation."65 Model Rule 1.8 states, in
relevant part:
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client
or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pe-
cuniary interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the
interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed
and transmitted in writing [to the client] in a manner that can be
reasonably understood by the client;
(2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and
is given reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent
counsel on the transaction; and
(3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the
client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's
role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is represent-
ing the client in the transaction.
(b) A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a
client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client gives in-
formed consent, except as permitted or required by these Rules.
(e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in con-
nection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:
(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation,
the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the
matter; and
63. Id.
64. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-432 (2004).
65. Id.
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(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs
and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.
66
In contrast to its position concerning the conflict of interest sec-
tion, the ABA departs from the majority view of states that do not
deem the posting of bond as a "court cost or expense of litiga-
tion."'67 The ABA argued that the release of a defendant from jail
can be a strategic or tactical objective in the course of representa-
tion, which may be "legitimately viewed as a cost of litigation.
'68
Yet, the ABA does not discuss how entering the business transac-
tion of posting bail for one's client could violate subsection (a) or
subsection (b) of Rule 1.8. Ostensibly, the attorney, in the role as
attorney, may learn information from his client that may lead him
to suspect that the client will flee the jurisdiction. It may be as
benign as the client inquiring about the consequences of fleeing the
jurisdiction. If the attorney fears that this inquiry promotes the
client's interest in flight, the attorney could seek to "jump off" the
bond and have the client returned to the custody of the state.69 In
this particular instance, the attorney would have used information
obtained through his representation of the client to take action ad-
verse to his client's interests. Alternatively, the attorney may use
the information against the client to keep the client from commit-
ting a crime, such as fleeing the jurisdiction. A fine line exists be-
tween the two arguments, which is probably fact specific, but that
would nonetheless, in the abstract if not in actual practice, seem to
66. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (2003).
67. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-432 (2004); see
also State Bar of Wis. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. E-96-1 (1998) (opining that "a bail,
bond or surety is not a court cost nor an expense of litigation under the exceptions in
1.8(e)"). But see Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal
Op. 2000-14 (2000) (concluding that "the bonding amounts said to be required in this in-
stance fall within the ambit of 'court costs and expenses of litigation"'). In that instance,
the attorney was advancing costs for a supersedeas bond on an eviction for an indigent;
failure to post that bond would in essence impede the litigation from proceeding. See id.
(analogizing the posting of a bond to litigation expenses in cases involving indigent clients).
But see Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 2005-4 (2005) (opining that "bail
appears to be close enough to court-related costs to constitute 'expense of litigation,' which
a lawyer may properly advance as long as the client remains liable therefore").
68. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-432 (2004).
69. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.19 (Vernon 2005) (providing the process
by which a surety releases himself from financial liability and surrenders the principal to
the state).
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violate the client's confidence. This Article will later explore this
last argument in greater detail in Section VII.
2. ABA Criminal Justice Standards
These ethical concerns are echoed in the ABA's Standards for
Criminal Justice 4-3.5. Subsection (a) is a parallel to Model Rule
1.7(a)(2) and prohibits an attorney from allowing "his or her pro-
fessional judgment or obligations to be affected by his or her own
political, financial, business, property, or personal interests.
7°
Supporting the prohibition, the ABA opines that the attorney owes
the client a duty of zealous representation without his judgment
being impaired with competing personal interests:
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within
the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of
compromising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal inter-
ests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons
should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.7'
Subsection () unequivocally asserts that a criminal defense at-
torney "should not act as surety on a bond either for the accused
represented by counsel or for any other accused in the same or a
related case."'72 Defending its assertion, the standards recognize
that some jurisdictions do not prohibit attorneys from acting as
sureties on bonds and emphasize that this practice interjects a limi-
tation that might undermine the objectivity that an attorney should
possess:
It is particularly important that a lawyer not act as surety with re-
spect to a client or another accused in the same or a related case.
This limitation enables the lawyer to avoid identification and in-
volvement with the client or codefendants that goes beyond the law-
yer's role as advocate and that might undermine the detachment that
an advocate should possess.
7 3
The standards provide an exception to the prohibition of acting
as a surety in cases where the attorney is posting bond for a non-
70. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DEFENSE FUNCTION, § 4-3.5(a) (3d ed.
1993).
71. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5-1 (1980).
72. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DEFENSE FUNCTION, § 4-3.50) (3d ed.
1993).
73. Id. Commentary Standard § 4-3.5, Lawyer As Surety on Bond.
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client not involved with a client's case, or when the principal is a
member of the attorney's family.74 The ABA has consistently dis-
couraged the practice of attorneys acting as a surety for their cli-
ents, placing supreme the ethical concerns that could compromise
the attorney's ability to provide zealous representation to his cli-
ent.75 It has stopped short, however, of determining that being a
client's surety is a per se ethical violation.76
In acknowledgment of the ethical concerns the American Bar
Association has explored, many states have established a prohibi-
tion on an attorney's ability to act as surety through state statutes,
or discouraged the practice through ethical opinions. The prohibi-
tions vary from an outright prohibition barring an attorney from
acting as a surety without regard to his relationship, personal or
professional, to the proposed principal, to an attorney only being
prohibited from acting as a surety for his client, thereby allowing
the attorney to function as a bondsman in certain proscribed
circumstances.
77
B. States That "Just Say No"
1. Wisconsin Statute and Delaware Rule
The Wisconsin statute represents the largest group of states that
expressly bar the attorney from acting as a surety in any circum-
stance. The statute explicitly prohibits "[n]o attorney practicing in
this state shall be taken as bail or security on any undertaking,
bond or recognizance in any action or proceeding, civil or criminal,
nor shall any practicing attorney become surety on any bond or
recognizance for any sheriff, constable, clerk of court or municipal
74. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-432 (2004)
(allowing an attorney to post bond for a relative); cf. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, DEFENSE FUNCTION, § 4-3.50) (3d ed. 1993) (mentioning an attorney may not
post bond for an accused client or for any other individual charged in the same or a con-
nected case).
75. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-432 (2004)
(advancing the position that lawyers should only post bond for their clients in rare circum-
stances); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DEFENSE FUNCTION, § 4-3.50) (3d ed.
1993) (advising that a criminal defense attorney should never serve as surety and attorney
for a client in the same matter).
76. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-432 (2004).
77. See, e.g., ALASKA R. Civ. P. 80(b)(1) (prohibiting the practice in its civil statutes);
ALA. CODE § 15-13-159(4)(e) (1975) (prohibiting the practice in its criminal statutes); S.C.
CIR. R. 11(d) (prohibiting the practice as a rule of court).
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judge. ' 78 Few states extend the prohibition to include the attorney
or any family member from becoming a surety. Rule 83 of the Su-
preme Court of the State of Delaware states:
A court of this State shall not accept any cash bail, special bail
bond or surety bond in respect of which an attorney or court officers
acts, directly or indirectly, as bail or surety. This prohibition shall
also apply to any agent, employee, member of the immediate family
of any such attorney or court officer, or any corporation in which
such attorney or court officer owns a controlling interest. This prohi-
bition shall not apply to any bond in which the attorney.., or family
member may be the principal.79
78. WIs. STAT. § 757.34 (2003). See ALA. CODE § 15-13-159(4)(e) (1975) (proclaim-
ing that professional surety companies must submit annually an affidavit certifying that "no
agents of the professional surety company who have the authority to execute appearance
bonds in its behalf or any person having a financial interest, direct or indirect .... is an
attorney ... or an agent of an attorney."); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 80(b) (stating, "no attorney
at law, peace officer, clerk of any court, or other officer of any court is qualified to be
surety on the undertaking"); ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 7.1(e) (requiring that a surety file with an
appearance bond "an affidavit that he or she is not an attorney or person authorized to
take bail"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-84-106 (1987) (stating that "no attorney ... shall be-
come a personal guarantor or surety in any criminal proceeding); IowA CODE ANN. § 621.7
(West 1999) ("No attorney or other officer of the court shall be received as security in any
proceeding in court"); Ky. R. CRIM. P. 4.30(2) (stating, "No attorney at law ... shall be
taken as surety on any bail bond, including bail on appeal"); MINN. DIST. C-. R. ANN. 139
(2005 ed.) ("No practicing lawyer shall be accepted as surety on a bond or undertaking
required by law."); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. ORCP 82(D)(1) (West 2005) ("No attorney at
law... is qualified to be surety on the undertaking."); W. VA. CODE R. § 31.01(d) (2005)
(stating that no attorney "shall sign as surety on any bond in any criminal case"); V.I.
CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 180(e) (2005) ("No attorney, marshal, police officer, clerk of any court,
or other officer of any court shall be permitted to become bail in any action."); cf Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 33-5-112 (2005) ("No practicing attorney shall be taken on any official bond,
or bond in any legal proceeding in the district in which he may reside."); see also Ohio &
Mississippi Ry. Co. v. Hardy, 64 Ind. 454, 454 (1878) (discussing that a rule of court prohib-
its attorneys from being received as surety on appeal, "which prohibits attorneys of this
court from being received as security in such cases").
79. DEL. Sup. CT. R. 83; accord KAN. STAT. ANN. § 78-101 (1985) (stating that "no
practicing attorney shall be taken on any official bond, or bond in any legal proceedings as
aforesaid, in the district in which the attorney resides"). Kansas has a corollary rule which
extends the prohibition to the attorney's family members. KAN. Sup. CT. R. 114 ("No
attorney or the attorney's spouse may act as a surety on a bond in any case in which the
attorney is counsel."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1303(B) (West 2001) ("[A]nd it is fur-
ther provided that licensed attorneys are prohibited from signing any bonds as surety in
any civil or criminal action pending or about to be filed in any court of this state."). Title I
of Section 11 of the Oklahoma Statutes Annotated prohibits family members or anyone to
whom the attorney has conveyed a property interest from being sureties. See OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, § 11 (West 2005) ("Licensed attorneys of this state, their spouses or anyone to
whom said attorneys have conveyed property for the purpose of signing bonds for said
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2. North Carolina, New York and Michigan Statutes
Some states prohibit the attorney from being a bail bondsman
and impose a criminal sanction for violation of that provision.8"
For example, the North Carolina statute does not allow an "attor-
ney... or spouse of any such person may in any case [to] become
surety on a bail bond for any person other than a member of his
immediate family."'" The family member exception is common in
statutes and ethics opinions, presumably because the attorney
would have such a close relationship with these members that the
familial ties might tend to outweigh the attorney's own personal
interest. In comparison, the criminal sanctions provision of the
North Carolina statute establishes that, "[a] violation of this sec-
tion is a Class 2 misdemeanor. '8 2 Similarly, the New York statute
that imposes criminal sanctions appears to be limited to attorneys
who profit from issuing a bail bond, thereby implying that if an
attorneys, are prohibited from signing any bonds as surety in any civil or criminal action.").
Most interestingly, this statute even includes a direct prohibition to the clerk of a court or
an officer of the court to accept a bond signed by licensed attorneys. See id. ("No court
clerk or judicial officer of this state shall accept any bonds signed by licensed attorneys,
their spouses or anyone to whom said attorneys have conveyed property for the purpose of
signing bonds for said attorneys."). Similarly, Virginia prohibits an employee of an office
of an attorney for the Commonwealth from obtaining a license as a bondsman. VA. CODE
ANN. § 9.1-185.4(B)(6), (8) (2005). The Virginia Code declares:
B. The following persons are not eligible for licensure as bail bondsmen and may not
be employed nor serve as the agent of a bail bondsman:
6. Employees of an office of an attorney for the Commonwealth;
8. Spouses of or any persons residing in the same household as persons referred to in
subdivisions 2 through 7 of this section.
Id.
80. GA. CODE ANN. § 45-11-8(a) (Supp. 2005) ("It shall be unlawful for any elected
official, officer of the court, law enforcement officer, or attorney in this state to engage
either directly or indirectly in the bail bonds business."). Section 45-11-8(b) of the Georgia
code also states that "[a]ny person who violates this Code section shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor." Id. § 45-11-8(b); see also N.Y. INS. LAW § 6804(c) (McKinney 2005) ("Any mem-
ber of the bar having any financial interest by which he is to profit from the giving of bail
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.").
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-541(a) (2005).
82. Id. § 15A-541(b); see also State v. Rogers, 315 S.E.2d 492, 513 (N.C. 1984) (hold-
ing that the revocation and suspension of law license for eighteen months upon conviction
for standing bail bond for a person not a member of attorney's immediate family was rea-
sonably related to rehabilitation and was neither improper nor impermissible).
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attorney were to provide a surety without charging a fee or pre-
mium he may fall outside the scope of that criminal statute.83
Still other states specifically prohibit the attorney from becoming
a surety for a client rather than banning the practice across the
board. For example, the Michigan code states that "[n]o practicing
attorney or counselor shall become a surety or post bond for any
client in criminal or civil matters."84 Nonetheless, an attorney may
post a bond for a client in probate matters and/or family law mat-
ters, so long as the amount of the bond does not exceed one hun-
dred dollars.85 This exception seems to follow the American Bar
Association's contention that if the amount at risk is inconsequen-
tial to the lawyer, the lawyer may still be able to proceed in the
representation without being conflicted by a financial interest in
the case.86
3. Colorado Statute
Colorado prohibits an attorney from becoming surety in any
bond unless the attorney obtains the consent of the court. 87 This
provision gives the district court judge great power in determining
whether an attorney should be granted the responsibility of posting
83. See N.Y. INs. LAW § 6804(c) (McKinney 2005) ("Any member of the bar having
any financial interest by which he is to profit from the giving of bail shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.").
84. MIcH. CoMP. LAWS § 600.2665 (2004); accord CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-67
(West 2005) ("No attorney-at-law may give any bond or recognizance in any criminal ac-
tion or proceeding in which he is interested as attorney."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 454.20 (West
2005) ("No attorney shall become surety on the official bond of any state, county, or mu-
nicipal officer of this state, nor surety on any bond of a client in judicial proceedings."); see
also FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.060(f) (announcing that "[n]o attorneys or other officers of the
court shall enter themselves or be taken as bail or surety in any proceeding in court."). But
see State v. Costello, 23 A. 868, 869, 61 Conn. 497 (1892) (holding that an appeal from a
conviction was not a criminal action or proceeding, thereby allowing an attorney to post an
appeal bond for a client).
85. MICH. Com1,. LAWS § 600.2665 (2004).
86. Cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-432 (2004)
(detailing the rare circumstances under which an attorney could serve as surety for his
client).
87. See CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-5-117 (West 2005). The statute states:
No attorney- or counselor-at-law shall become surety in any bond or recognizance of
any sheriff or coroner, in any bond or recognizance for the appearance of any person
charged with any public offense, or upon any bond or recognizance authorized by
statute to be taken for the payment of any sum of money into court in default of the
principal without the consent of a judge of the district court first had approving said
surety.
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surety for his client. This approach creates a case-by-case analysis
that is determined by a judge who may have reason to know the
attorney seeking the authority to become a surety for his client. In
these circumstances the judge may be privy to the lawyer's reputa-
tion and his standing in the community, including the attorney's
trustworthiness and propensity for reaching objective decisions.
Conversely, there is also some danger in this approach, in that a
judge may not give this request deliberate consideration and pro
forma grant attorneys the right to become sureties for their clients.
In contrast, the Colorado Criminal Practice and Procedure Man-
ual discourages the practice of attorneys serving as their client's
bail bondsman by arguing:
Defense counsel should expend maximum effort to obtain release of
the client as soon as possible after book-in. Statistics and practical
logic indicate that the greatest single handicap to achieving proba-
tion or lenient treatment in court is remaining in custody until trial.
Furthermore, release on bail will remove the client from the influ-
ence of the police and lessen the likelihood that the client might
make incriminating statements. In no event, however, should a law-
yer use the lawyer's own money to post bail or be the surety for the
client, because doing so is unprofessional and, without consent of the
district court judge, is illegal. Similarly, it is unprofessional for a law-
yer to co-sign a client's bond.88
C. States with Ethics Opinions
In addition to the statutes, many states have issued ethical opin-
ions discouraging the practice. A review of ethics opinions from
around the country reveals a focus on the same ethical concerns
regarding violation of client confidences, an attorney's financial in-
terest impairing the attorney's unbiased judgment of his client's
case, and the improper solicitation of clients.8 9
88. Robert J. Dieter, Lawyer's Entry into the Criminal Case, 14 COLo. PRAC., CRIMI-
NAL PRACHCE & PROCEDURE § 1.27 (2d ed. 2005).
89. See Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 1981-55
(1981) (opining that a relatively large bond might place the attorney in a position of acquir-
ing an interest adverse to his client: "We can imagine situations where the lawyer's concern
that the client maintain the wherewithal to meet his or her bond obligations might interfere
with the attorney's judgment with respect both to the particular case for which the bond is
required, and to other matters."). However, the California ethics committee concluded
that if the bond is needed for litigation, then "having the bond issue is in the client's best
interest because it permits the litigation to go forward." Id. It did not, however, opine as
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to whether in that case it deemed the bond to be a cost of litigation. Id. This appears to be
an argument of access to the courts for the client, in which case it would be in the client's
best interest; however, the California ethics committee warned, "In light of the potential
for acquiring an adverse interest ... a prudent lawyer will seek to avoid guaranteeing a
client's relatively large litigation bond." Id.; cf Fla. State Bar Prof'l Ethics Comm., Op. 72-
26 (1972) (opining that "a lawyer is not ethically restrained from engaging in business, if he
does not mingle the business with his law practice, either physically or functionally, and if
the business does not operate as a feeder to this law practice" (emphasis added)); Ill. State
Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'I Ethics, Op. 802 (1983) (opining that "[b]y acting as surety on a
client's bond, a lawyer is guaranteeing financial assistance to the client on matters that
pertain directly to the pending litigation .... the lawyer could be considered to have en-
tered into a business transaction with a client outside the normal scope of representation
and this relationship has the potential for conflict between the duties of an attorney and
the relationship created as surety"). The Illinois Bar Association Advisory Opinion con-
cludes by determining that "[t]he combination of the potential for conflict, the guarantee
of financial assistance and the business nature of the relationship between principal and
surety results in the inescapable conclusion that the relationship must be avoided by attor-
neys representing the personal representative of the estate is precluded [sic] from acting as
surety on the bond of his client." Id.; see also State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Prof'l and
Judicial Ethics, Informal Op. RI-65 (1990) (illustrating why a lawyer should not be a surety
in a client's case: "[in the event of the client's disappearance, or refusal or inability to
satisfy the terms of the surety, the lawyer's interest as surety conflicts with what may be the
client's interest in staying at large, or pursuing a course of action contrary to that of the
surety"); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Op. 647 (1993) (stating that since
New York has a statute prohibiting the practice of attorneys acting as bail bondsmen for
their clients, it is consequently unethical); N.C. State Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. RPC
173 (1994) (opining that "lending a client the funds necessary to post a cash bond ... is
contrary to the policies prohibiting conflicts of interest and solicitation..."); ef Ky. Bar
Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. E-82 (1974) (concluding that "an attorney could not accept em-
ployment from those for whom he executed bonds .... [But] there would not necessarily
be any ethical prohibition against execution of bonds as attorney-in-fact when confined to
those not represented by the attorney"). A lawyer acting as a bondsman "has a vested
interest in seeing that the client is apprehended if he or she flees the jurisdiction." N.C.
State Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. RPC 173 (1994). That interest conflicts with a lawyer's
responsibilities to his client. Id. The committee also recognized the "strong likelihood that
a lawyer could solicit clients by suggesting that he is willing to lend a criminal defendant
bond money in order to solicit the defendant's criminal case." Id.; cf. Okla. Bar Ass'n
Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 271 (1973) (opining that an attorney who executes a recogni-
zance bond for his client is not in violation of the statute prohibiting an attorney from
acting as surety by determining that a recognizance bond is not the same as signing a bond
as surety); Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 2005-4 (2005) (concluding that "advanc-
ing significant bail funds, especially in the absence of a strong personal or familial relation-
ship, could result in a personal conflict of interest between lawyer and client"); Pa. Bar
Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 92-59 (1992) (warn-
ing that a lawyer should not engage in a business interest which might directly or indirectly
conflict with those of a client: "In the course of representing a client, incidental matters
might arise such as the client's needs for a surety .... A lawyer serving or having an
interest in any of those businesses is obviously in a conflict-of-interest with his or her cli-
ent"); State Bar of Wis. Comm. on Prof'I Ethics, Op. E-96-1 (1996) (reiterating that the
Wisconsin statute that prohibits an attorney from posting bond for someone who has been
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1. Kansas Ethics Opinion
The Kansas Bar Association's Ethics Advisory Committee
thoughtfully and deliberately analyzed the potential ethical viola-
tions that may arise when an attorney seeks to practice law and
engage in the bail bond business. 90 Specifically, it addresses those
ethical violations in relation to Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct 1.6, 1.7 and 1.8. Preliminarily, the ethics opinion addresses the
lack of authority on the topic of attorneys as bail bondsmen, and
remarks that "[g]iven the long association of bail bonding with the
criminal justice system, there is a remarkable lack of authority on
this topic." 91 The Kansas statute that addresses the topic of law-
yers as bondsmen was enacted in 1867, and remains essentially the
same. 92 The committee addresses the antiquity of the statute and
establishes that "[w]e believe that even though the statute is old, it
applies regarding bonds the attorney may want to issue within the
judicial district where the attorney resides .... [S]tate statutes pre-
vent the attorney from directly acting as a bail bondsman to any-
one, client or non-client." 93 The opinion analyzes MRPC 1.8,
which deals with prohibited transactions and determines that being
a client's bail bondsman can materially affect the lawyers interest,
concluding that "[t]he obligations of a bondsman on a bail bond is
[sic] considerable. And if the client skips on the bond, it 'materi-
ally' affects the lawyer's own financial interests in the bond busi-
ness." 94 The Kansas Supreme Court reiterated the high degree of
fiduciary duty owed to the client, holding that "business transac-
tions between attorney and client are subject to strict and crucial
arrested indicates that the conduct would also violate the rules of professional conduct).
Moreover, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that there are no exceptions to the stat-
ute, and that "it applies to all attorneys whether or not an attorney-client relationship is
involved." Id. (citing Gilbank v. Stephenson, 30 Wis. 155 (Wis. 1872)).
90. Kan. Bar Ass'n Ethics-Advisory Comm., Op. 98-12 (1998).
91. Id.
92. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 78-101 (2005) (stating that "no state or county officers, or
their deputies, shall be taken as surety on the bond of any administrator, executor, or other
officer, from whom, by law, bond is or may be required"). The statute also provides that
"[n]o practicing attorney shall be taken on any official bond, or bond in any legal proceed-
ings ... in the district in which the attorney resides." See generally Sherman v. State, 4
Kan. 570 (1868) (explaining that the 1867 statute had been enacted in part because lawyers
were officers of the court, and the courts were not allowed to take bonds from their own
officers that benefited private litigants).
93. Kan. Bar Ass'n Ethics-Advisory Comm., Op. 98-12 (1998).
94. Id.
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scrutiny, and such agreements are construed in a manner most
favorable to the client." 95 Ultimately, the ethics committee opined
that the provisions in the rules of professional conduct "preclude
lawyers from handling both the criminal representation and writing
the bail bond for the same client."96
2. South Carolina Ethics Opinion
The South Carolina Ethics Advisory Committee used an actual
case to illustrate how an attorney can get into a compromising posi-
tion by guaranteeing repayment of a client's debts.97 In Grievance
Committee, Charleston County Bar Ass'n v. Lempesis,98 an attor-
ney had personally guaranteed to repay the expenses his clients
had incurred from a car collision,99 but at some point during the
representation he forged his clients' signatures on a settlement
agreement. 100 In discussing the dangers of an attorney acquiring a
financial interest in a case, the Ethics Advisory Committee pointed
to the Lempesis case as:
[I]llustrative of the possible effect such an arrangement might have
on the attorney's professional judgment reserved for his client. By
obtaining a financial stake in the handling of a particular case, an
attorney might be tempted to push his client into accepting a settle-
ment offer which the attorney would ordinarily advise be turned
down.10
While acknowledging that not all attorneys would, given the
same set of circumstances, behave in the same way as the attorney
in Lempesis, the committee cautioned that "the possibility remains
that numerous clients will be denied real representation if an attor-
ney stands to be sued on a guaranty. 1 0 2 The committee concluded
that "the practice of guaranteeing financial assistance to clients
with a case contemplated or pending should be prohibited as un-
95. Phillips v. Carson, 731 P.2d 820, 832 (Kan. 1987) (citing DAVID J. MEISELMAN,
ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.5, at 9 (1980)).
96. Kan. Bar Ass'n Ethics-Advisory Comm., Op. 98-12 (1998).
97. S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 90-02 (1990).
98. 148 S.E.2d 869 (S.C. 1966).
99. Grievance Comm., Charleston County Bar Ass'n v. Lempesis, 148 S.E.2d 869, 871
(S.C. 1966).
100. Id. at 872.
101. S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 90-02 (1990).
102. Id.
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ethical and clearly beyond the scope of the Code of Professional
Responsibility."'1 °3 The practice of acting as surety for a client in a
criminal defense matter is analogous to an attorney taking a finan-
cial interest in the outcome of a case, as in Lempesis, because a
criminal defense attorney can only be released from his financial
obligation when a client has attended all court hearings or is re-
turned to the custody of the state, and therefore the opportunity
for a client to default exists throughout the duration of the repre-
sentation, or stated differently, until there is an outcome.
3. Virginia Ethics Opinion
Elaborating on the myriad potential conflicts that may arise
when an attorney engages in providing bond for a client, a Virginia
Ethics Opinion suggests that attorneys should not engage in the
practice of becoming surety for a client:
A lawyer engaged in criminal defense work may not also own
stock in a professional bail bond company that provides bail bonds to
the lawyer's clients. Disclosure and consent cannot cure the conflict
between the lawyer's duty as an advocate and his own interest in
avoiding a forfeiture should the client fail to appear in court. Addi-
tionally, this type of business transaction with a client might easily be
viewed as unconscionable, unfair, or inequitable. The issue of client
confidentiality is also raised by the vision of a lawyer torn between
his own financial interests and preserving the clients confidences and
secrets, particularly where the client's whereabouts are the crux of
the matter.' °4
4. Iowa Ethics Opinion
The Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics and Con-
duct issued an ethics opinion in 1986 addressing the question of
whether a lawyer could personally post bond for a criminal defen-
dant-client' a 5 In reaching its decision, the board identified three
potential instances of conflicts, including an interesting dilemma
103. Id.
104. Va. Opinion 1343, [1986-1990 Transfer Binder] Lawyers' Manual on Prof'l Con-
duct (ABA/BNA) § 901:8771 (1990).
105. Iowa State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'I Ethics and Conduct, Formal Op. 86-04
(1986).
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which has not been addressed by many jurisdictions. 0 6 Aside from
the arguments that it might improperly provide a "feeder" to his
law practice and that the client and attorney may have different
goals for the outcome, the Iowa Board found an attorney serving
simultaneously as a surety could also hinder a client's ability to
seek another attorney if the attorney-client relationship terminates
due to a dispute between the attorney and client. °7 While the
board did not elaborate on why the client's freedom to seek alter-
nate counsel might be affected, it implies the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel argument. 108 For instance, in circumstances where
the criminal case is close to trial, the judge may de facto deny a
client's ability to fire his attorney by denying a continuance of the
trial. In doing so, the court would not afford the client time to seek
new counsel and grant that new attorney time to properly prepare
for a trial. In that situation, if the relationship with the client's at-
torney-bail bondsman has deteriorated because of a dispute, then
the client would have no choice but to proceed to trial with that
attorney, in whom she may no longer have any confidence. Simi-
larly, if the client has paid for the legal representation in a flat fee,
and possibly also a premium or fee on the bond, the client may not
be in a financial position to terminate her attorney's services and
hire another attorney and/or bail bondsman-in effect, denying her
right to counsel of her choosing. Ultimately, the Iowa board con-
cluded that "there does exist the appearance of impropriety when,
without some special circumstance a lawyer does post personal
bond for a criminal defendant."' 1 9 While it does not encourage the
practice, the board does acknowledge that there could be instances
where it would be appropriate without expanding on what those
instances could be. 110
106. See id. (indicating that one potential conflict of interest could occur when a client
may wish to appeal or seek a delay while an attorney might want to have funds returned to
him as soon as possible, yet if the attorney follows the client's wishes, those funds will be
held for a longer period of time).
107. Id.
108. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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5. Colorado Ethics Opinion
The Colorado Bar Association (CBA) Ethics Committee en-
gaged in a comprehensive analysis of the rules of professional con-
duct when addressing concerns about attorneys engaging in a dual
practice, a combination of legal and nonlegal occupations. It eval-
uated whether involvement in a second occupation would violate
the improper solicitation of legal services rule by considering three
factors: (1) whether the second occupation is conducted from the
law office premises; (2) whether the second occupation is related to
the practice of law; and (3) whether the lawyer provides both legal
and nonlegal services in the same transaction.11" ' With regard to
whether the second occupation is conducted from the law office
premises, the committee explored the possibility that it could give
rise to a violation of the improper solicitation rule, also known as
the "feeder" rule. 12 In the case of a bail bondsman, if during the
course of seeking a bail bond and clients noticed that the bonds-
man was also an attorney and consequently retained him as an at-
torney for the underlying criminal matter that necessitated the
bond, then an appearance of impropriety arises that the bail bond
business "fed" the law practice. As for the relationship of the sec-
ond occupation to the practice of law, the committee addressed the
heightened ethical risk if the second occupation is law-related.
113
Specifically, the committee stated:
In carrying on law-related occupations and professions the lawyer
almost inevitably will engage to some extent in the practice of law,
even though the activities are such that a layman can engage in them
without being engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. If the
second occupation is so law-related that the work of the lawyer in
such occupation will involve, inseparably, the practice of law the law-
yer is considered to be engaged in the practice of law while con-
ducting that occupation. Accordingly, he is held to the standards of
111. Colo. Bar Ass'n. Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 98 (1996),
112. Id. (citing CoLo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.2(c), 7.3(a) (1996)).
113. The concern arises that an attorney would be held accountable for his actions
under the Rules of Professional Conduct if the second occupation was closely related to
the practice of law. "Lawyers engaged in a second occupation unrelated to the lawyer's
law practice are nevertheless required to follow the Rules, except those Rules applicable
only to lawyers acting as lawyers." Colo. Bar Ass'n. Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 98 (1996).
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the bar while conducting that second occupation from his law
offices.' 14
Additionally, relating to the second criterion, the committee dis-
cussed the problem of a client erroneously assuming "that the at-
torney-client privilege attaches to their communications [regarding
the second occupation] or inadvertently waiving the privilege if it
does apply in the first instance." '115 In a related matter, the com-
mittee also discussed the flip side of that dilemma: the problem of
an attorney using the information against a client that was gained
"in performing the services related to the second occupation.
116
The committee discussed the practicality of distinguishing under
what "profession" the information was obtained:
[A]s a practical matter it may be difficult or even impossible to dis-
tinguish between information learned in the lawyer's capacity as an
attorney and in operating a law-related business from the same of-
fice. This information is not limited to client confidences or secrets
but applies to "all information to the representation, whatever its
source."
117
In addressing the last criterion, the second occupation being car-
ried out in the same transaction as the practice of law, the commit-
tee warned that this posed "the greatest ethical risk of all,
particularly if the second occupation is law-related and conducted
from the law office."11 8 This should be particularly poignant to at-
torneys who engage in the issuance of bail bonds. For example, a
client seeking to be released from jail may come to a bail bonds-
man who is also a criminal defense attorney. If both businesses
operate out of the same location, the client may see the issuance of
bond to be law-related and the attorney's subsequent representa-
tion on the underlying criminal matter to be part of the same busi-
ness transaction. This grey area is made murkier when the
114. Id. (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 328
(1972)).
115. Id. (citing to Dennis J. Block, Irwin H. Warren & George F. Meierhofer, Jr.,
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.7: Its Origin and Interpretation, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 739, 760-62 (1992)).
116. See Colo. Bar Assoc. Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 98 (1996) (citing CoLo. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.8(b), 1.9 (c) (1996)).
117. Colo. Bar Assoc. Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 98 (1996) (citing COLO. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCr 1.6 cmt. (1996)).
118. Colo. Bar Assoc. Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 98 (1996).
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attorney agrees to apply the bond premium, or fee, to his legal
fees." 9 In that situation, the attorney all but erases the line be-
tween the first and second occupations. The Colorado ethics com-
mittee analyzed this last criterion using the rules of professional
conduct regarding conflicts of interest and entering into business
transactions with a client.120 In that analysis, the first determina-
tion is whether there is "another client," that is, whether the attor-
ney's loyalties will be owed to a third party. 121 If there is no other
client, then the attorney must determine whether the representa-
tion of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsi-
bility to a third party or by the lawyer's own interests.12 2 The client
must be informed of this potential conflict and the advisability of
seeking independent counsel, and must be "given a reasonable op-
portunity to seek the advice of such independent counsel. 1 123 Fi-
nally, the client must consent in writing to the representation.
124
Referring to the last criterion, the ethics committee unequivo-
cally stated its disapproval of lawyers acting as a lawyer and engag-
ing in another business capacity in the same transaction.
25
Further, it stated that "[s]ome dual occupation transactions are so
fraught with ethical risk that the CBA Ethics Committee discour-
ages them even with the informed consent of the client, such as
transactions in which a lawyer acts both as lawyer and real estate
broker." '26 In the context of a criminal defense attorney simulta-
119. See GREATER SAN ANTONIO SOUTHWESTERN BELL YELLOW PAGES 313-318,
§ BAIL BONDS (2005) (providing advertisements that attorneys will apply the bond fee
toward legal fees).
120. See Colo. Bar Assoc. Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 98 (1996) (noting the relevance
of ethical rules dealing with conflicts of interest and business transactions, but acknowledg-
ing the prevalence of other ethical dilemmas in this area as well).
121. COLO. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.7.
122. Id. 1.7(b).
123. Id. 1.8(a).
124. Id. Although Texas does not require consent to be in writing, it does mandate
that if a disinterested attorney is informed of the specific facts and determines that a client
could not possibly consent under those facts, the attorney seeking that opinion is prohib-
ited from seeking the consent of the client. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.06
cmt. 1, reprinted in TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon 2005) (TEX.
STATE BAR R. art. X, § 9) (establishing that although an attorney should decline represen-
tation when an impermissible conflict is determined before representation, if the same con-
flict is only discovered or develops during representation then the attorney must take steps
to eliminate the conflict or seek withdrawal, if necessary).
125. Colo. Bar Assoc. Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 98 (1996).
126. Id.
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neously serving as the client's bail bondsman, the lawyer must be
extremely cautious with the handling of these inherent, and often-
times irreconcilable, competing interests.
VI. TEXAS OPINES, BUT SAYS LITTLE
In stark contrast, while the vast majority of the states specifically
prohibit attorneys from acting as bail bondsmen, or severely limit
the extent to which an attorney can post bail, Texas permits its at-
torneys to simultaneously engage in the practice of commercial
sureties. 127 Texas ethics opinions provide only a cursory review of
the ethical issues that arise from this dual representation, and yet
Texas has what is likely the only statutory provision allowing attor-
neys to serve in this dual role without providing a detailed analysis
to help guide the attorney through the mire of ethical quicksand.
The ethics opinions also seem contradictory at times.
The Texas ethics committee noted that "[t]he question of
whether or not it is unethical for an attorney to act as surety on a
criminal bond has been raised several times, and the opinions con-
cerning this question are somewhat confusing. ' 128  Arguably, not
only does Texas permit the practice, but through its enactment of
the attorney exemption statute and the subsequent ethics opinions,
it tacitly encourages it. There is little to discourage a criminal de-
fense attorney in Texas from becoming a bail bondsman for his cli-
ent, and frankly, plenty of incentives to becoming one.
129
Historically, Texas prohibited the practice of attorneys acting as
127. TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 1704.163 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
128. Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 347
(1969).
129. By serving as the client's bail bondsman, the attorney can generate an additional
source of income and essentially guarantee payment of fees if the client fears that failure to
timely pay bond fee installments will cause the attorney to "jump off" the bond, thereby
subjecting the client to recapture and detention in jail. In the case of our client, Stephanie,
she consistently checked in every Monday with her criminal defense attorney's office by
personally appearing and paying on her bail bond fee. In the nearly year and a half that
she had been released on bail, she had paid her criminal defense attorney approximately
$7500 as her bail bond fee for her bond (which had been set at $75,000). See Letter from
Stephanie Smith, client, to Donna Bloom, co-author (Dec. 13, 2005) (on file with the St.
Mary's Law Journal) (providing details of her experience as a criminal defendant client
with an attorney also acting as her bail bondsman).
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bail bondsmen for their clients.130 Ethics opinions since the 1950s
vacillate between determining that an attorney ethically may not
serve as surety to concluding that there is no ethical violation if the
attorney is to act as surety.13 1 The lack of a brightline rule prohib-
iting an attorney from acting as surety, juxtaposed with the duties
and obligations owed a client, as codified in the Disciplinary Rules
of Professional Conduct, has caused Texas attorneys to inquire
whether the practice of acting as bail bondsmen for their clients is
ethical.132
These ethics opinions analyzed seven canons of ethics, with an
emphasis on Canon 6, which deals with Adverse Influences and
Conflicting Interests, and Canon 24, which deals with Solicitation,
130. The statute authorizing attorneys to serve as their client's bondsman was enacted
in 1959; prior to that the practice had vacillated between being allowed and prohibited,
primarily through ethics opinions.
131. Compare Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex.,
Op. 46 (1952) (opining that an attorney may sign his name as surety for individuals indicted
for felonies), and Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op.
248 (1962) (opining that "[i]t is not unethical for a member who does not practice criminal
law to accept appointment as attorney-in-fact for a surety company"), and Comm. on In-
terpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 251 (1962) (opining that it is
not a violation of the canons of ethics for an attorney to act as surety in his client's criminal
bond), and Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 347
(1969) (opining that "[a]n attorney may act as surety on his client's criminal bond so long
as an attorney client relationship exists prior to signing" as surety), with Comm. on Inter-
pretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 140 (1957) (opining that an attor-
ney may not act as surety on his client's bond in a criminal case), and Comm. on
Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 141 (1957) (opining that an
attorney practicing criminal law may not engage in the business of making bail or other
bonds in criminal cases).
132. See Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 347
(1969) (containing multiple inquiries as to whether an attorney can be a bondsman and for
whom); Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 248
(1962) (questioning whether it is ethical for an attorney who does not practice criminal law
to accept appointment as attorney-in-fact for a surety company); Comm. on Interpretation
of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 251 (1962) (questioning whether it is a
violation of the canons of ethics for an attorney to act as surety in his indigent client's
criminal bond); see also Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of
Tex., Op. 140 (1957) (inquiring as to whether it is a violation of the rules of conduct for an
attorney to be surety for a criminal defense client); Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons
of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 141 (1957) (questioning whether it is a violation of the
canons of ethics for a criminal defense attorney to engage in the business of making bail or
other bonds in criminal cases) Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar
of Tex., Op. 46 (1952) (questioning whether an attorney can sign as surety for clients or
friends charged with crimes).
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direct or indirect. 133 These ethics opinions predate the adoption of
both the Texas Code of Professional Responsibility and the subse-
quent Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct; hence,
they rely on the canons of ethics which were in place before the
rules used today. Notably, the canon most discussed in the ethics
opinions is Canon 24.134 Texas Canon 24 states:
A member should not solicit professional employment by circulars
or advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews not
warranted by personal relations, or endeavor to procure such em-
ployment through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate
firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds
or wills, or offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trust-
eeships to be influenced by a member. Indirect advertisements for
professional employment such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments about causes in which the member is engaged or the im-
portance of the member's position, and all other like self-laudation
should be avoided.
1 35
A. Opinions 140 and 141
For example, Opinion 140, issued in 1957, addresses the question
of whether an attorney may act as surety on his client's bond in a
133. See Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 388
(1977) (analyzing Canons 4, 5, and 7); Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics,
State Bar of Tex., Op. 366 (1974) (analyzing Disciplinary Rules 1-201 through 2-105);
Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 351 (1970) (ana-
lyzing Canons 6, 31 and 35); Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of
Tex., Op. 347 (1969) (analyzing Canon 24); Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of
Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 251 (1962) (analyzing Canon 24); Comm. on Interpretation
of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 248 (1962) (analyzing Canon 24); Comm. on
Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 141 (1957) (analyzing Canon
24); Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 140 (1957)
(analyzing Canon 24); Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex.,
Op. 46 (1952) (analyzing Canon 6).
134. Five of the nine ethics opinions referenced above use Canon 24 as the basis for
their ethical analyses. See Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of
Tex., Op. 140 (1957) (analyzing Canon 24); Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of
Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 141 (1957) (analyzing Canon 24); Comm. on Interpretation
of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 248 (1962) (analyzing Canon 24); Comm. on
Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 251 (1962) (analyzing Canon
24); Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 347 (1969)
(analyzing Canon 24).
135. STATE BAR OF TEX., RULES AND CANONS OF ETHics, Canon 24 (1957, super-
seded 1971).
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criminal case. 136 The ethics committee confirmed that there was no
specific canon of ethics that would be violated if an attorney acted
as surety.137 The committee referred to Rule 142 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure, which stated in relevant part: "No attor-
ney ... shall be surety in any cause pending in the Court, except
under special leave of Court."'1 38 Acknowledging that the rule ap-
plied to civil cases, the committee nonetheless determined that if
an attorney were to act as a surety on his client's criminal case he
would be in violation of the spirit of the rule and of Canon 24.139
Similarly, Opinion 141 determined that an attorney who engaged
in the practice of criminal law violated Canon 24 if he simultane-
ously posted bail or bonds for individuals accused of crimes. 140 The
committee opined:
All members of the committee are of the opinion it is a violation
of Texas Canon of Ethics 24 for an attorney who practices criminal
law to engage in the business of making bail or other bonds in crimi-
nal cases, whether he makes such bonds under his own name or an
assumed name, or to be in any way connected with, or have any in-
terest in, any company which is engaged in the business of making
bail or other bonds in criminal cases, regardless of where such com-
pany maintains its office, and regardless of whether it advertises its
business.1
4 '
B. Opinions 248 and 251
Conversely, Opinion 248 analyzed whether it was ethical for an
attorney who does not practice criminal law to accept an appoint-
ment as an attorney-in-fact for a surety company who writes bail
136. Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 140
(1957).
137. Id.
138. Id. However, Rule 142 has since been amended with the 1988 amendments to
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and replaced with a new rule which appears to allow
attorneys to serve as sureties for trial and appellate costs. William W. Kilgarin, George
Quesada & Robin Russell, Practicing Law in the "New Age": The 1988 Amendments to the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 19 TEX. TECH L. REV. 881, 886 (1988).
139. Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 140
(1957).
140. Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 141
(1957). The committee did not provide an analysis when reaching this decision; it merely
determined that it did violate Canon 24.
141. Id.
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bonds.' 42 The committee determined that such conduct would not
be unethical, although it is undesirable. 143 The ethics committee
noted that the bail bond practice "may or may not feed the practice
of a civil law attorney," and therefore would not violate Canon
24.'11 However, if the attorney used the bail bond business to so-
licit legal work he would then be in violation of Canon 24.145
Reaching the same conclusion in Opinion 251, the committee de-
termined that an attorney who acts as a bondsman for a criminal
defense client is not in violation of the rules of ethics.146 To deter-
mine whether the attorney would be improperly soliciting legal
work, the committee stated that the crux of the analysis revolves
around the attorney's motivation in seeking the bond work; if his
motivation is to solicit legal work then the attorney might be in
violation of Canon 24.147
C. Opinion 347
In Opinion 347 the committee engaged in its most thorough
analysis, while still cursory compared to opinions from other juris-
dictions,'148 regarding an attorney acting as bail bondsman. 149 The
fact situation related by the inquirer seeking the opinion is, in rele-
vant part:
A practicing attorney habitually engages in the practice of acting
as surety on bail bonds in criminal cases, thereafter representing the
individuals upon whose bond he acts as surety. The Judge of the
District Court of the county where the above practice occurs has en-
142. Id.




146. Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 251
(1962).
147. Id.
148. See generally Colo. Bar Assoc. Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 98 (1996) (dedicating
over thirteen pages to the discussion of the ethical concerns associated with engaging in
dual practice); California Standing Comm. on Prof'I Responsibility and Conduct, Formal
Op. 1995-141 (1995) (detailing a "lawyer's ethical responsibilities when providing non-legal
services to a client").
149. Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 347
(1969).
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tered an order, which is filed with the District Clerk, authorizing the
lawyer-bondsman to engage in the practice as acting as surety.
150
The committee stated that "It]he business of acting as surety on
criminal bonds could very easily be a feeder to the attorney's prac-
tice of law.' 151 Further, the committee warned about the unethical
nature of an attorney advancing funds to a potential client in order
to obtain the case. 152 Conversely, once an attorney-client relation-
ship has been established, the attorney may advance funds to the
client so long as he does not do so "with such notoriety as to consti-
tute indirect solicitation. ' 153 The committee concluded:
After the attorney client relationship has come into existence, it is
not unethical for an attorney to sign as surety on his client's criminal
bond, so long as he does not do so with such notoriety as to consti-
tute indirect solicitation. If the attorney-client relationship has not
come into existence, it is unethical for an attorney to sign as a bonds-
man and thereafter represent the principal on the bond in a criminal
case. This is true even if the attorney has been given authority by the
Court to sign as bondsman.'
54
D. Opinion 366
The last opinion to address Canon 24, at least tangentially, is
Opinion 366.155 The committee posed the question of whether an
attorney could have a financial interest in a bail bond business if he
did not participate in the actual business and did not accept em-
ployment from a client of the bail bond business. 56 In its discus-
sion the committee made reference to six prior ethics opinions, all
revolving around the question of whether it is unethical for an at-
torney to be in any way connected to the practice of bail bonds.
157
In contrast to the six prior opinions, the committee made its deter-





154. Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 347
(1969).
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thereby making the wording in Canon 24 obsolete.158 Specifically,
the committee stated:
The primary basis for the above [six] opinions has been that the
operation of the bail bond business constituted "indirect solicitation"
and served as a "feeder" to the law practice. These phrases have
been entirely omitted from the Code of Professional Responsibility
indicating an intent not to rely on such vague phrases as standards by
which to judge the outside activities or occupations of attorneys.
Such activities are now governed by several comprehensive but spe-
cific disciplinary rules, particularly DR 1-201 through DR 2-105.159
Utilizing Disciplinary Rule 2-102(E) as the basis for its conclu-
sion, the committee determined that an attorney may engage in
both the practice of law and another business as long as he does
"not so indicate on his letterhead, office sign or professional card,
nor ... identify himself as a lawyer in any publication in connec-
tion[ ] with his other profession or business.' 160 The committee
also opined that a lawyer who has a financial interest in the bail
bond business but neither participates in the business nor accepts
employment through clients of that business in doing so will not
violate the rules of ethics.'61 Interestingly, the committee com-
mented that the bail bond business was so law-related that if an
attorney were to participate in that practice he would in essence be
considered to be engaging in the practice of law and accordingly
would be expected to comply not only with Disciplinary Rule 2-
102(E), but also with all other provisions of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. 162
E. Opinion 46
It is axiomatic that Texas has chosen to analyze these ethical
quandaries in the ambit of solicitation rather than one which safe-
guards the inviolate loyalties owed to a client. For example, of the
nine Texas ethics opinions discussed herein, five were reached by
utilizing Canon 24 addressing solicitation, while only two utilized
158. Id.
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Canon 6, which addresses adverse influences and conflicting inter-
ests.1 63 Specifically, Canon 6 addresses the duties owed to clients
and seems the most relevant provision when determining whether
an attorney can ethically represent a client in a criminal defense
matter when he is her bondsman.
164
Moreover, Opinion 46, which is based on Canon 6, does not dis-
cuss why the practice of being a bondsman for a client would not
violate it; rather, it merely states, without discussion or interpreta-
tion, that "[a] majority of the members of the committee are of the
Opinion that becoming such sureties is not a violation of the law or
any Canon of Ethics.
1 65
F. Opinion 388
Notably, only one Texas ethics opinion considers the attorney as
bondsman business enterprise from the perspective of protecting
the client rather than merely protecting the image of the legal pro-
fession. 166 In Opinion 388, the ethics committee analyzed the ques-
tion of whether an attorney who serves as his criminal defense
client's bail bondsman violates the Code of Professional Responsi-
163. See Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 46
(1952) (analyzing Canon 6); Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of
Tex., Op. 140 (1957) (analyzing Canon 24); Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of
Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 141 (1957) (analyzing Canon 24); Comm. on Interpretation
of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 248 (1962) (analyzing Canon 24); Comm. on
Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 251 (1962) (analyzing Canon
24); Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 347 (1969)
(analyzing Canon 24); Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex.,
Op. 351 (1970) (analyzing Canons 6, 31 and 35); Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of
Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 366 (1974) (analyzing Disciplinary Rules 1-201 through 2-
105); Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 388 (1977)
(analyzing Canons 4, 5, and 7). Five of the nine ethics opinions referenced supra note 133
use Canon 24 as the bases for their ethical analysis. See Comm. on Interpretation of the
Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 140 (1957) (analyzing Canon 24); Comm. on Inter-
pretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 141 (1957) (analyzing Canon 24);
Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 248 (1962)(ana-
lyzing Canon 24); Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op.
251 (1962) (analyzing Canon 24); Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State
Bar of Tex., Op. 347 (1969) (analyzing Canon 24).
164. STATE BAR OF TEX., RULES AND CANONS OF ETHICS, Canon 6 (1957, superseded
1971).
165. Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 46
(1952).
166. Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 388
(1977).
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bility if he subsequently, during the representation, "goes off" the
bond, resulting in the client being jailed. 167 In a thoughtful opin-
ion, the committee analyzed Canons 4, 5 and 7, which concern pre-
serving the confidence and secrets of a client, exercising
independent professional judgment on behalf of a client, and zeal-
ously representing a client within the bounds of the law, respec-
tively.168 The committee began its analysis with a determination
that, based on the fact situation before it, the attorney had engaged
in both the practice of law by establishing an attorney-client rela-
tionship and in a separate business transaction. In doing so, the
attorney subjected himself to the Rules of Professional Conduct for
the actions he took in each of his two roles.169 Further, the com-
mittee placed a higher burden on an attorney who seeks to "go off"
his client's bond by stating that if Canons 4, 5 and 7 are viewed
conjunctively, it would "strongly indicate that a lawyer could turn
his client in and relieve himself from the obligations of the bond
only in the event that the client is about to commit an act contrary
to the law" and that the lawyer knows this as a matter of fact.
170
The opinion considers Disciplinary Rule 7-101, which states in rele-
vant part, "a lawyer shall not intentionally:.., prejudice or damage
his client during the course of the professional relationship,"'171 and
determines that it would be "clearly apparent that a lawyer who
turns his client in to the authorities for any other reason than that
provided in Disciplinary Rule 7-102172 would be in violation of Dis-
167. Id.
168. TEX. STATE BAR R., art. XII, § 8, Canon 4 (Tex. Code of Profl Resp.), 34 TEX.
B.J. 765 (1971, superseded 1990); TEX. STATE BAR R., art. XII, § 8, Canon 5 (Tex. Code of
Prof'l Resp.), 34 TEX. B.J. 766 (1971, superseded 1990); TEX. STATE BAR R., art. XII, § 8,
Canon 7 (Tex. Code of Prof'l Resp.), 34 TEX. B.J. 768 (1971, superseded 1990).
169. Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 388
(1977).
170. Id.
171. See id. (citing TEX. STATE BAR. R., art. XII, § 8, DR 7-101 (Tex. Code of Prof'l
Resp.), 34 TEX. B.J. 768 (1971, superseded 1990)).
172. Id. Texas State Bar Rule DR-7-102 states, in relevant part:
In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or
fraudulent
(8) Knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to a Disciplinary
Rule.
(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
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ciplinary Rule 7-101(A)(3)."'17 3 Moreover, the committee consid-
ered the ethical requirements that a lawyer be sensitive to the
rights and wishes of his clients and not use information obtained in
his professional relationship, and that information should not be
used to disadvantage a client or to benefit the lawyer's own pur-
pose without the client's consent. 74 Ultimately, the committee
cautions attorneys that they are under the "onus of a higher re-
sponsibility to the client than would be a professional
bondsman.
1 75
Being that a client is owed the highest duty of loyalty and zeal-
ous representation, and attorneys must preserve the client's confi-
dences inviolate, a thorough review under the Texas Professional
Rules of Disciplinary Conduct must be undertaken when determin-
ing whether it is proper for an attorney to act as his client's bail
bondsman.
VII. RISK ANALYSIS: TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
An attorney's uncompromising loyalty to his client's interests
forms the very foundation of the attorney-client relationship in the
United States. This loyalty can only be properly carried out if a
lawyer fully comprehends that any other interest of the lawyer,
whether personal or professional, has the potential to compromise,
if not destroy, the lawyer's necessary dedication to "vindicating the
client's legal position.1' 7 6 In Texas, courts have asserted that the
attorney-client relationship is one of "most abundant good faith;
[which requires] absolute and perfect candor . ..openness and
honesty; [and] the absence of any concealment or deception
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a
person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify same, and if his client
refuses or is unable to do so he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or
tribunal.
TEX. STATE BAR R., art. XII, § 8 DR 7-102 (Tex. Code of Prof'l Resp.), 34 TEX. B.J. 768
(1971, superseded 1990).




176. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 146 (Hornbook Series
Practitioners ed. 1986) (discussing the expectation of loyalty a client has of her lawyer).
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.... 177 Furthermore, "[t]he relationship existing between attor-
ney and client is characterized as 'highly fiduciary,' and requires
proof of 'perfect fairness' on the part of the attorney. ' 178 When a
lawyer's separate interest threatens to compromise the interests of
his client, "the Disciplinary Rules come into play.' 1 79 If an attor-
ney chooses to avail himself of the statutory attorney exemption
providing the opportunity to serve in the role as both bail bonds-
man and legal advocate for his criminal defendant client, he like-
wise exposes himself to scrutiny under the Texas Disciplinary Rules
of Professional Conduct. 180 In fact, the ethics committee for the
State Bar of Texas has spoken on this very issue and explained that
those legal rights statutorily provided to a surety or bondsman
"[do] not override the ethical responsibilities and considerations of
a lawyer who has accepted the responsibilities imposed upon him
by the attorney-client relationship. ' 181 Therefore, the practice of
acting as bail bondsman for a criminal defendant client raises ethi-
cal concerns in four areas: (1) conflict with the client involving the
lawyer's own potentially adverse pecuniary interest; (2) protection
177. Hefner v. State, 735 S.W.2d 608, 624 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref d) (quot-
ing State v. Baker, 539 S.W.2d 367, 374 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ ref d n.r.e.)).
178. Jackson Law Office, P.C. v. Chappell, 37 S.W.3d 15, 22 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2000,
pet. denied) (citing Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735, 739 (Tex. 1965) and Montgomery v.
Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 312-14 (Tex. 1984)).
179. Tex. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 555, 68 TEx B.J. 228 (2004).
180. See Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 388
(1977) (recognizing the potential violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct if an at-
torney were to act in the dual capacity of attorney and bail bondsman); see also RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 10 cmt. g (1998) (identifying that an
attorney may ethically operate an ancillary business, such as a real estate agency, insurance
agency, consulting enterprise, or similar business along with a law practice, so long as the
dual practice is "conducted in accordance with applicable legal restrictions, including those
of the lawyer codes"). When the services offered as a part of the ancillary business are not
distinct and understood as separate by the client, the ancillary service could be considered
as part of the legal services rendered for purposes of adherence to the lawyer code. Id.
Determining the distinctive nature of the ancillary services depends on a variety of factors,
including the client's understanding of the separateness of the services, the location where
the services are offered (same location would suggest less distinction), and the identities of
the personnel working on the matter (whether each enterprise relies on separate staff). Id.
Therefore, an attorney acting as bail bondsman from one office with one set of staff mem-
bers is likely to be subjected to the Texas Rules in both enterprises.
181. Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 388
(1977).
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of client confidentiality; (3) improper solicitation of clients; and (4)
financial relationships between a lawyer and his client.
1 12
A. Conflict of Interest: General Rule
Under the Texas Disciplinary Rules, a lawyer is expected to "act
with competence, commitment and dedication" regarding the in-
terests of the client and to advocate zealously on the client's be-
half. 8 3 When an attorney acts as his client's bail bondsman, he
enters into a written undertaking with the state to guarantee the
appearance of his client at all subsequent hearings on the matter.1
8 4
And, as surety, he will be free of the obligation under the contract
only when the terms of the bond have been met: in other words,
when the pending criminal matter has been resolved. 8 5 This un-
dertaking constitutes "a contract between the surety and the
state.' 1 8 6 Delivering the criminal defendant to court is at the heart
of the bargain. If the attorney-bail bondsman fails to deliver on his
promise, he will likely be subject to a significant personal financial
182. See California Standing Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal
Op. 1995-141 (1995) (detailing a lawyer's ethical responsibilities when providing nonlegal
services to a client); Fla. State Bar Prof'l Ethics Comm., Op. 90-1 (1990) (explaining the
hardship placed on the attorney-client relationship when a lawyer breaches client confi-
dence to inform the court about a client's intent to jump bail); N.Y. St. Bar Assoc. Comm.
on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 647 (1993) (discussing the concern that an attorney providing bail
could place his own recovery over that of the client's interest); N.C. St. Bar Assoc. Ethics
Comm., Op. RPC 173 (1994) (indicating the strong likelihood that an attorney could use
the offer of bail bond assistance as a means to solicit the defendant's criminal case); see
also Kan. Bar Assoc. Ethics-Advisory Comm., Op. 98-12 (1998) (advancing the position
that although an attorney is permitted to enter into a business transaction with a client, he
may not do so if the interest acquired is adverse to the interests of the client). Kansas
further prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if he would be materially limited by
his own interest. Id. Because the Kansas Bar considers the "obligations of a bondsman on
a bail bond" to be considerable, especially "if the client skips on the bond," attorneys in
that state are precluded from handling both the criminal matter and the bail bond for the
same client. Id.
183. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.01 cmt. 6.
184. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.02 (Vernon 2005) (stating that a "bail
bond" is a written agreement by the defendant and his sureties guaranteeing his appear-
ance before some court).
185. 41 GEORGE E. Dix & ROBERT 0. DAWSON, TEXAS PRACTICE, CRIMINAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 16.24 (2d ed. 2001).
186. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JC-0121 (1999) (addressing whether a county judge may
act as a surety on a bail bond in the county where he presides); accord Morin v. State, 770
S.W.2d 599, 599 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989), pet. dism'd, improvidently
granted, 800 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc); Keith v. State, 760 S.W.2d 746,
747 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988), affd, 802 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc).
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loss in the form of bond forfeiture.8 7 This contract with the state is
a business arrangement separate and distinct from the legal repre-
sentation the attorney is bound to provide the criminal defen-
dant.18 8  Moreover, the contract provides a financial obligation
where the lawyer's interests could potentially conflict with the in-
terests of the client.18 9
Texas Disciplinary Rule 1.06 clearly prohibits a lawyer from rep-
resenting a client where he has potential or actual conflicting inter-
ests with that of his client. 190 And at least one Texas ethics opinion
has recognized that "[w]hen an attorney personally executes a bail
bond for and on behalf of a client accused of a crime, he, at such
time, is both rendering a service to the client and creating a poten-
tial area of conflict between himself and his client." 191 In most
cases, an attorney may cure the evil of conflicting interests with the
informed consent of the client.'92 However, consent does not sim-
ply involve disclosure of the conflict and potential risk involved,
187. See Matt Joyce, Lawyer Contests Bond Tab, WAco TRIBUNE-HERALD, Oct. 29,
2005, at 1B (covering an attempt by a Waco lawyer also serving as his client's surety to
avoid a $50,000 forfeiture when the client "went underground").
188. Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 388
(1977).
189. See Tex. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 555, 68 TEX. B.J. 228 (2004) (discussing the
permissibility under the Rules for a lawyer to enter into a business arrangement with a
chiropractor where the lawyer owns a portion of the chiropractor's practice, the lawyer
refers his clients to the chiropractor, and the lawyer receives a share of the profits, includ-
ing those profits attributable to the clients referred by the lawyer).
190. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.06(b)(2) (emphasizing that "a
lawyer shall not represent a person if the representation of that person . . .reasonably
appears to be or become adversely limited . . . by the lawyer's ... own interests"); Tex.
Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 555, 68 TEX. B.J. 228 (2004) (illustrating the analysis neces-
sary when considering the permissibility under the Rules for a lawyer to enter into a busi-
ness arrangement that could conflict with his client's interests); see also Comm. on
Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 71 (1953) (indicating that
where there would be even a possible conflict of interest, the representation would be
improper).
191. Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 388
(1977).
192. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.06(c)(1), (2). This rule states that:
A lawyer may represent a client in the circumstances described in (b) if. (1) the lawyer
reasonably believes the representation of each client will not be materially affected;
and (2) each affected or potentially affected client consents to such representation
after full disclosure of the existence, nature, implications, and possible adverse conse-
quences of the common representation and the advantages involved, if any.
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but requires the lawyer to consider, independent of the client's
consent, whether "a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the
client [should or] should not agree to the representation under the
circumstances."1 93 If the lawyer concludes the client should not
agree, then he "should not ask for such agreement or provide rep-
resentation on the basis of the client's consent." 194 It is also possi-
ble to conclude that given the vulnerability of one accused of a
crime and under the traumatic influence of a recent arrest and de-
tention, the disclosure will not obviate the conflict, which would
also require the attorney to avoid the dual role notwithstanding the
client's consent. 19 Judicial decisions addressing "nonconsentable"
193. Id. 1.06 cmt. 7; accord id. 1.06 cmt. 1 (establishing that although an attorney
should decline representation when an impermissible conflict is determined before repre-
sentation, if the same conflict is discovered or develops during representation then the
attorney must take steps to eliminate the conflict or seek withdrawal, if necessary).
194. Id. 1.06 cmt. 7.
195. See N.Y. St. Bar Assoc. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 647 (1993) (providing rea-
sons behind the position that lawyers may not post bond for those persons they represent);
Va. Opinion 1343, [1986-1990 Transfer Binder] Lawyers' Manual on Prof'l Conduct (ABA/
BNA) § 901:8771 (1990) (asserting that "disclosure and consent cannot cure the conflict
between the lawyer's duty as an advocate and his own interest in avoiding a forfeiture
should the client fail to appear in court"); cf Tex. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 555, 68 TEX.
B.J. 228 (2004) (contending that a lawyer who owns a portion of a chiropractor's practice
may not refer his clients to the chiropractor in exchange for a share of the latter's profits,
even with full disclosure and client consent, because the conflict of interest involved is not
one for which it would be proper to seek client consent); Tex. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op.
547, 66 TEX. B.J. 430 (2003) (clarifying that a lawyer may not enter into an arrangement
with a group of medical professionals pursuant to which the group would fund the law
firm's television advertisements with the expectation, but not the obligation, that the law
firm would refer clients to the medical group, even with full disclosure to any client so
referred, because "the law firm could never meet the requirements of Rule 1.06(c)(1) with
respect to the conflict of interest involved"); Tex. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 543, 65 TEX.
B.J. 763 (2002) (expressing that lawyer could not enter into an arrangement to serve as in-
house counsel for a health-care provider at a reduced fee in return for the provider's refer-
ral of its clients suffering from personal injuries to the lawyer, because lawyer could not
meet Rule 1.06(c)(1)'s standards); Tex. Comm. on Prof'I Ethics, Op. 536, 64 TEX. B.J. 694
(2001) (opining that a lawyer may not receive a fee from an investment adviser for refer-
ring his clients to the adviser for investment advice, even with full disclosure and informed
client consent, because "the standards of Rule 1.06(c) cannot be met under these circum-
stances"); Tex. Comm. on Prof'I Ethics, Op. 535, 64 TEX. B.J. 78 (2001) (noting that a
lawyer cannot participate in a court-sponsored lawyer-for-a-day program, whereby lawyers
volunteer to represent indigent criminal defendants, but are paid for their services only if
their client pleads guilty that day, because "there could never be an adequate basis for a
determination that both requirements of Rule 1.06(c) are met" in those instances); Tex.
Comm. on Prof's Ethics, Op. 500, 58 TEX. B.J. 380 (1995) (opining that a lawyer cannot
represent multiple plaintiffs in an automobile accident once it becomes clear that the funds
available to satisfy their claims is substantially less than the reasonable value of those
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conflicts frequently involve facts establishing that the client, who is
often less than sophisticated in hiring an attorney, was not ade-
quately informed or was not capable of fully appreciating the
threat involved in the conflict.
96
It is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which a lawyer's
own interest in avoiding the financial loss of forfeiture would inter-
fere with the attorney's otherwise good judgment, candor, and loy-
alty owed to his client. For example, the attorney may desire to
release himself from financial liability on the bond (getting "off the
risk")197 based on concerns and conclusions reached as a result of
confidential client communications (an ethical dilemma, in and of
itself).198 The attorney may be reluctant to disclose his intention to
"jump off" the bond to his client, fearing that this information may
encourage the client's failure to appear and place the attorney's
financial position in further jeopardy. 199 This fear may not be mis-
claims because, in effect, the lawyer's clients are very much like opposing parties in litiga-
tion within the meaning of Tex. Rule 1.06(a)). Other jurisdictions have occasionally con-
cluded that conflicts of types deemed "nonconsentable" in Texas can be waived by a
lawyer's clients, provided those clients are given sufficient disclosure of the conflicting in-
terests involved and it does not otherwise appear that the lawyer's representation or exer-
cise of independent professional judgment on their behalf will be impaired. See State Bar
of Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Op. 05-01 (May 2005) (explaining that dissent-
ing members of the committee recommended following the prophylactic approach fol-
lowed in Texas).
196. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122 cmt. g(iv)
(1998).
197. See 41 GEORGE E. Dix & ROBERT 0. DAWSON, TEXAS PRACTICE, CRIMINAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 16.24 (2d ed. 2001) (explaining the professional bondsman's
role in pretrial release, including the process by which a surety may "get off the risk" by
absolving himself of financial liability on the bond).
198. See Fla. State Bar Prof'l Ethics Comm., Op. 90-1 (1990) (relating that "[ciriminal
defendants when talking with their lawyers.. . often think out loud about skipping out, or
come right out and say that they plan not to show up for court again; and yet, in a great
majority of these cases, when the time comes, they do show up for court, in spite of what
they have said"). If lawyers, after receiving this type of client communication, felt obli-
gated to inform the court of the client's disclosure, the end result could be the destruction
of the attorney-client relationship. Id.; see also Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of
Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 388 (1977) (emphasizing that an attorney executing a bail
bond on behalf of his client "creat[es] a potential area of conflict between himself and his
client" and may not "go off such bond and thereby cause his client to be placed in jail,
unless such attorney knows as a matter of fact that his client is planning to commit a crime,
a fraud, or is about to refuse to comply with the terms of the bond") (emphasis added).
199. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.19 (Vernon 2005) (providing the pro-
cess by which a surety releases himself from financial liability and surrenders the principal
to the state).
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placed, given that the likely result of the attorney's release of
surety is subsequent arrest and detention of his client.2z°
However, the attorney contemplating release of the bond and
arrest of his client would do well to explore the provisions of Disci-
plinary Rule 1.03 detailing the obligation of an attorney to "keep a
client reasonably informed about the status of a matter. ' 20 1 In-
deed, the comment section of this Rule unequivocally asserts that a
"lawyer may not, however, withhold information to serve the law-
yer's own interest or convenience. "202 Even a commercial bail
bondsman is required to provide notice to the defendant's attorney
of her intention to surrender the defendant to authorities.20 3 The
attorney wearing both the hat of a bondsman and that of an advo-
cate could certainly be torn regarding his strategy when faced with
potential or actual noncompliance of a client with the terms of a
surety agreement. It is entirely possible that an attorney's concern
that his client maintains the wherewithal to satisfy his obligations
under the terms of the bond may interfere with the lawyer's judg-
200. See id. (detailing when a judge finds "cause for the surety to surrender his princi-
pal," the court is required to issue an arrest warrant so the defendant may be taken back
into custody).
201. TEx. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.03(a).
202. Id. 1.03 cmt. 4.
203. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.19(a)(6) (Vernon 2005) (providing the
process and requirements involved in surrendering the bond and acquiring an arrest war-
rant). Presumably, the statute's requirement of notice to the principal's attorney is an
attempt to provide due process to the principal, so that he may contest the surrender if he
believes it to be unreasonable. This requirement of notice begs the question of what no-
tice, if any, an attorney is required to provide his client when he intends to surrender the
bond. An attorney, it seems, would not be forced to swear to the requirement that he
provided notice to himself. Conceivably, a defendant would lose at least some due process
protection if his attorney is also his bail bondsman and the attorney fails to inform his
client of his plan. Cf Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 84 (1988) (asserting
that "[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding
which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them the opportunity to
present their objections"). For example, Stephanie, our client, was taken completely by
surprise. She met her attorney at his office first thing on a Wednesday morning to discuss
the plea bargain conference scheduled for the next day, and by noon she was in the custody
of "bounty hunters," being transferred to the county jail on order of her attorney-who
never disclosed his intention to surrender her bond. See Telephone Interview with Emile
Harmon, Student Attorney, St. Mary's University School of Law Center for Legal and
Social Justice (Jan. 3, 2005) (explaining the details that led up to Stephanie's plea bargain).
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ment when advising his client on the criminal matter.2 °4 But there
is no dilemma for a nonlawyer bail bondsman; when faced with the
same set of facts she would not hesitate to pursue surrender. In
fact, she would merely be doing her job.2 °5 An attorney, on the
other hand, has a higher calling and a greater duty that rises above
that of his interest as a bail bondsman. One state ethics committee
put it this way:
So long as there remains any possibility that counsel may be able
to effect a court appearance by a client, in spite of the client's claims
that the client will not be going to court when required, experience
teaches and ethics requires that effectuating the client's appearance
is what counsel must spend his or her energies trying to accomplish.
Working towards resolving the anticipated problem [with the client]
... rather than telling the court about the anticipated problem, is
what is ethically required of the lawyer.2"6
In a Texas ethics opinion addressing the very subject of the pro-
priety of an attorney jumping off the bond of his client, the com-
mittee spoke to the right of a bail bondsman to surrender the
principal under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, adding that
"[t]his right, however, seems to speak to the legal right of a surety
or bondsman, but does not override the ethical responsibilities and
considerations of a lawyer who has accepted the responsibilities
imposed upon him by the attorney-client relationship.
2 0 7
204. See California Standing Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal
Op. 1981-55 (1981) (exploring the adverse effect of an attorney guaranteeing a bond on the
representation provided to the client).
205. See Telephone Interview with Helen Allred, Owner, A-Tex Bonding Co. (Jan. 5,
2006) (commenting on the role she believes a bail bondsman plays when performing on his
contract with the state to deliver the defendant to court). Ms. Allred is also a member of
the board of directors of Professional Bondsmen of Texas. It should be noted, however,
that in surrendering the principal, Ms. Allred is required to provide notice of her intention
to the principal's attorney and swear to completion of this requirement in the affidavit to
the court seeking an arrest warrant. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.19(b)
(Vernon 2005) (explaining that the court must determine that cause exists for the surrender
before issuing an arrest warrant). Conceivably, a defendant would lose at least some due
process protection if his attorney is also his bail bondsman.
206. Fla. State Bar Prof'I Ethics Comm., Op. 90-1 (1990) (explaining the hardship
placed on the attorney-client relationship when a lawyer breaches a client confidence to
inform the court about the client's intent to jump bail).
207. Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 388
(1977). This opinion asserts that a "lawyer is under the onus of a higher responsibility to
the client than would be a professional bondsman." Id.
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The nature of the relationships between a bail bondsman and his
customer and a lawyer and his client are entirely distinct. The busi-
ness of commercial bail bonding is "a cross between insurance and
law enforcement. 2 0 8 The commercial bail bondsman effectively
steps into the shoes of the state to guarantee the defendant appears
in court on his criminal matter when requested.20 9 The bail bonds-
man "may do whatever is necessary, to insure [sic] that the defen-
dant will return to court, including taking collateral, requiring the
defendant to report in phone or in person, requiring a defendant to
be monitored and even placing a guard on the defendant, if neces-
sary to insure [sic] their return. ' 210 In essence, a bail bondsman is
"an arm of the criminal justice system. ' 211
In stark contrast to that of a bail bondsman, an attorney's "basic
duty ... is to serve as the accused's counselor and advocate with
courage and devotion and to render effective, quality representa-
tion. ' 212 When an attorney engages in both occupations simultane-
ously there is the danger that the two will be blurred in the
experience of the client. 213 And, "[t]he common thread in the legal
authority on this subject is a concern that lawyers avoid creating
. . . a likelihood of confusion in the mind of the client about
whether services are being performed within the lawyer's role as a
lawyer or within the lawyer's role in the second occupation.
'214 "If
an attorney is to represent his client [with diligence,] he should [be
well informed] of the circumstances surrounding the client's [al-
208. Kan. Bar Assoc. Ethics-Advisory Comm., Op. 98-12 (1998).
209. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.42 (Vernon 2005) (relating the respon-
sibilities of a county's personal bond office, which provides a similar service as bail bonds-
man for those defendants the court releases on personal bond). A personal bond is a
means by which a defendant is released from detention pretrial without sureties or other
security. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.03 (Vernon 2005).
210. See Professional Bail Agents of the United States, What is Bail?, http://www.
pbus.com/displaycommon.cfm?an=l&subarticlenbr=l&printpage=True (last visited Jan. 5,
2006) (providing information and resources about commercial bail) (on file with the St.
Mary's Law Journal).
211. Telephone Interview with Helen Allred, Owner, A-Tex Bonding Co. (Jan. 5,
2006) (commenting on the role she believes a bail bondsman plays when performing on the
contract with the state to deliver the defendant to court).
212. JOHN M. BURKHOFF, CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHics 2d 754 (2005).
213. See Colo. Bar Assoc. Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 98 (1996) (concerning the ethi-
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leged criminal conduct]." Often the client will not understand
what information she possesses is relevant. Therefore, it is critical
to disclose everything she knows to her attorney. If the client
screens this information because of worries about what the attor-
ney may choose to disclose to the court, she may censor relevant
information. The veracity of the adversary system relies on a cli-
ent's trust in her attorney and the confidentiality inherent in their
relationship.2 15 Given the necessity for complete candor between
the criminal defendant client and her lawyer, any confusion about
the attorney's role influencing the client to withhold information is
a serious risk and could have life-altering consequences.2 16
B. Confidentiality
The Texas Supreme Court stated that "[a] lawyer has a solemn
obligation not to reveal privileged and other confidential client in-
formation, except as permitted or required in certain limited cir-
cumstances as provided in the rules. ,217  Violating the
confidentiality of a client is at the heart of the ethical quagmire
faced by an attorney acting as his client's bail bondsman. An attor-
ney has a duty to cautiously guard the confidences and secrets of
his client,218 whereas a bail bondsman has only his financial invest-
ment to protect. When an ethical attorney inhabits both roles si-
215. See Timothy J. Miller, Note, The Attorney's Duty to Reveal a Client's Future
Criminal Conduct, 1984 DUKE L.J. 582, 593 (1984) (exploring questions concerning an at-
torney's duty to reveal his client's intent to commit a criminal act).
216. Stephanie often expressed concerns to her student attorneys representing her in
a family law matter about the quality of her criminal representation, but believed she could
not discuss them openly with her attorney because, as her bail bondsman, he had the
power to return her to jail. Telephone Interview with Emile Harmon, Student Attorney,
St. Mary's University School of Law Center for Legal and Social Justice (Jan. 3, 2005).
217. Duncan v. Bd. of Disciplinary Appeals, 898 S.w.2d 759, 761 (Tex. 1995); see gen-
erally TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.06 (detailing the provision of an attor-
ney's duty of confidentiality to her clients).
218. See JOHN M. BURKHOFF, CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHICS 2d 143 (2005) (citing
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1983) for the following:
[T]he fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client and the proper func-
tioning of the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of confidences and
secrets of one who has employed him or sought to employ him. A client must feel free
to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer and his lawyer must be equally free to
obtain information beyond that volunteered by his client .... [t]he observance of the
ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client
... facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation .... ).
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multaneously, he does so on a wing and a prayer that he will not
find himself in the midst of a sticky situation. 219 But, given the
statutory requirements regulating the business of bail bonding, a
very real possibility exists that he will be forced to consider violat-
ing his client's confidence at some point in his attorney-bail bonds-
man career.
220
If a bail bondsman wishes to be released from financial responsi-
bility on the bond and surrender the principal back into the cus-
tody of the sheriff, he is required to seek an arrest warrant by filing
an affidavit of his intention "before the court or magistrate" where
the prosecution is pending.22' This affidavit must include, among
other things, "the name of the defendant;.., the date of the bond;
[and] the cause for the surrender. ' 222 In the facts supporting the
cause for surrender, an attorney will face the most troublesome
ethical challenges because he will likely breach his client's confi-
dence in an effort to end his liability on the bond. For example, an
attorney who wishes to reduce his risk on the bond and place his
client back in jail may need to include in the affidavit certain state-
219. See Matt Joyce, Lawyer Contests Bond Tab, WACO TRIBUNE-HERALD, Oct. 29,
2005, at 3B (covering an attempt by a Waco lawyer, also serving as his client's surety, to
avoid a $50,000 forfeiture when the client "went underground"); see also Akridge v. State,
13 S.W.3d 808, 809 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, no pet.) (urging the court to consider that
attorney's representation resulted in a conflict of interest because he also served as her bail
bondsman); Mendez v. State, No. 05-00-01743-CR, 2001 WL 946824 at *1 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2001) (not designated for publication) (arguing his counsel was ineffective due to an
undisclosed conflict of interest from serving as both lawyer and bail bondsman).
220. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.19 (Vernon 2005) (providing the pro-
cess by which a surety releases himself from financial liability and surrenders the principal
to the state). This statute requires the surety to submit an affidavit to the court with juris-
diction in the criminal matter, relating the cause for the surrender of the principal. Id. It is
the responsibility of the court to determine from the affidavit that the surety has sufficient
cause to release himself from the financial risk of the bond and deliver the principal back
into custody. Id.; see also TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 1704.202(d) (Vernon 2004) (requiring
bonding business's client files to be made available to the county bail bond board for in-
spection on demand); Id. § 1704.252(4) (making it a violation of bonding business regula-
tions to refuse to answer questions about a bail bondsman's conduct when posed by the
county bail bond board during a hearing relating to the revocation or suspension of privi-
lege to write bail bonds); Id. § 1704.053(5) (identifying the district attorney or assistant
district attorney as a permanent member of the county bail bond board).
221. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.19 (Vernon 2005); see also 41 GEORGE E.
Dix & ROBERT 0. DAWSON, TEX. PRAC., CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 16.24
(2d ed. 2001) (relating the process by which a surety may "get off the risk" of a bond).
222. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.19 (Vernon 2005).
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ments made by the client that suggest she is planning to run.223
Additionally, he may need to describe specific actions taken by the
client that create concern in his mind about future bail jumping.2 24
In some cases, a bail bondsman may want to be released from lia-
bility on the bond simply because the principal is not complying
with the terms of the contract entered into between herself and the
principal when the bail bond was executed.225
As a bail bondsman, when a client is noncompliant or unreliable,
the only question needing an answer is what would be the best time
to catch the judge at the courthouse. In contrast, an attorney act-
ing also as a bail bondsman, with a similar client problem, must
consult Texas Disciplinary Rule 1.05 before putting the final
touches on his affidavit to surrender the principal. Rule 1.05 de-
tails the scope of the protection of a client's confidential informa-
tion and provides, in part, that "a lawyer shall not knowingly
[r]eveal confidential information of a client.., to a person that the
client has instructed is not to receive the information; or anyone
else, other than the client, the client's representatives, or the mem-
bers, associates, or employees of the lawyer's law firm. ' 226 The
rule requires a lawyer to protect not only communication subject to
the attorney-client privilege, but also any other "information relat-
ing to a client or furnished by the client ... [and] acquired by the
lawyer during the course of or by reason of the representation of
the client." 2 7 Upon review of these provisions of the rule, it
should appear clear to a reasonable attorney that he is prevented
from making any disclosure in the affidavit needed to establish the
required cause to surrender. He should conclude that any informa-
tion about a client's action or inaction, any information he gath-
ered from family and friends about the client, and certainly, any
223. See 41 GEORGE E. Dix & ROBERT 0. DAWSON, TEX. PRAC., CRIMINAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 16.24 (2d ed. 2001) (providing examples of what may constitute
cause under the statute).
224. Id.; see also Fla. State Bar Prof'l Ethics Comm., Op. 90-1 (1990) (relating un-
founded attorney concerns over criminal defendants not showing up for court).
225. See Telephone Interview with Helen Allred, Owner, A-Tex Bonding Co. (Jan. 5,
2006) (explaining that she will seek to be released from responsibility on the bond when
the client fails to comply with the terms of the contract, which may include provisions
about payment and checking in on a weekly basis).
226. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.05(b) (emphasis added).
227. Id. 1.05(a).
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statements made by his client to him, are all protected under this
rule.
A lawyer wishing to jump off the bond badly enough will scruti-
nize Rule 1.05 for any exceptions providing him an opportunity to
disclose client secrets. A closer examination will reveal a variety of
exceptions including client consent and the crime-fraud excep-
tion.228 Since most clients are not likely to agree to return to jail,
the lawyer will likely look to the crime-fraud exception. This ex-
ception allows an attorney the discretion to reveal client confi-
dences "[w]hen the lawyer has reason to believe it is necessary to
do so in order to prevent the client from committing a criminal or
fraudulent act."'229 Since bail jumping is a crime 230 and the lawyer's
action to surrender his client into custody will prevent this criminal
act, the bail bondsman lawyer may believe this makes the submis-
sion of an affidavit including client secrets ethical under the Rule.
However, he would be wise to dig a little deeper before rushing to
the courthouse with affidavit in hand. The lawyer considering how
and when to exercise the discretion conferred by paragraph (c) of
this Rule should consider a number of variables. First, the com-
ment to Rule 1.05 on the subject of a discretionary disclosure ad-
verse to the client indicates that only "[w]hen the threatened injury
is grave, the lawyer's interest in preventing the harm may be more
compelling than the interest in preserving confidentiality of infor-
mation."' 231 Additionally, "such factors as the magnitude, proxim-
ity, and likelihood of the contemplated wrong, the nature of the
lawyer's relationship with the client and with those who might be
injured by the client, the lawyer's own involvement in the transac-
tion, and factors that may extenuate the client's conduct in ques-
tion" should inform the attorney's exercise of discretion.232 The
comment continues with a warning that "a disclosure adverse to
the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer believes
necessary to the purpose. "233 It would require a fairly creative at-
torney to argue successfully that the injury of bail jumping is grave
228. Id. 1.05(c)(2), (7).
229. Id. 1.05(c)(7).
230. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 38.10 (Vernon 2003) (describing the penalties associ-
ated with jumping bail or failing to appear).
231. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.05 cmt. 13.
232. Id. 1.05 cmt. 14.
233. Id.
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or is a crime of magnitude with a victim to protect, other than pos-
sibly the defendant himself, in the event of capture, and her bail
bondsman, who will suffer a financial loss when she fails to appear
at the appropriate hearing.
Importantly, subsections (d) and (e) of the Texas Disciplinary
Rules suggest that before an attorney entertains the notion of re-
vealing a client confidence, he is first obligated to attempt to dis-
suade the client from running by clearly explaining the
consequences of such an action.2 34 Further, the attorney can avoid
any concerns he may have about assisting the client in her crime or
fraud by withdrawing from the representation. In adopting this ap-
proach, the attorney is able to keep the client's confidences and
free himself of concerns he may have of participating in any way in
the client's possible future failure to appear in court. Of course,
this approach will do nothing to protect the financial risk associ-
ated with serving as surety in the matter. And recent amendments
to the attorney exemption statute clarify that "[a] person executing
a bail bond or acting as surety under ... [the exemption] ... is not
relieved of liability on the bond solely because the person [attor-
ney] is later replaced as attorney of record in the criminal case." '235
A final cautionary note is in order as it pertains to the lawyer's
duty to maintain his client's confidences. Rule 1.05(b)(2) affirma-
tively prohibits an attorney from "[using] confidential information
of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client con-
sents after consultation. '236 It is difficult to imagine a greater dis-
advantage than one's own attorney playing a significant part in
returning her to confinement. Additionally, the further disadvan-
tage resulting from the loss of one's bail bond fee is to be left in a
position to scrape together another fee (if that is even possible).237
And, finally, the ultimate disadvantage is that of losing trust and
confidence in one's attorney, as well as the legal system as a
234. Id. 1.02.
235. TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 1704.163(c) (Vernon Supp. 2005).
236. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.05(b)(2).
237. Letter from Stephanie Smith, client, to Donna Bloom, co-author, 1 (Dec. 13,
2005) (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal) (providing details of her experience as a
criminal defendant client with an attorney also acting as her bail bondsman). Stephanie's
bond was set at $75,000 and she paid a total of $7500 in a surety fee to her attorney, all of
which he applied to her legal fees. She was able to pay this amount in installments over
approximately 18 months. At the time her attorney surrendered her back into the custody
of the sheriff, she owed $360 on the fee. Id.
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whole. 38 It seems unlikely a client would sign up for that, so con-
sent is probably out of the question. Finally, Rule 1.05(b)(4) spe-
cifically prohibits an attorney from the "[u]se [of] privileged
information of a client for the advantage of the lawyer ... unless
the client consents after consultation. ' 239 When an attorney acting
as a bail bondsman submits his affidavit to the court detailing his
cause for surrendering the principal (his client), he is most likely
relying on privileged information he acquired in the course of his
representation.24 ° In so doing, he is seeking an advantage for him-
self on the weight of the information provided. In other words, he
has gained the fee negotiated at the initial execution of the bail
bond and has used the protected information to relieve himself of
any further liability. This appears to violate the letter and spirit of
the law.
C. Prohibited Solicitations and Payments
"Why pay for a Bondsman when you can get a
Lawyer? 'I will get you out of jail and defend you'
All Bail Bond Fees Apply to Attorney Fees "241
"Why pay twice? Your bond fee goes
towards your legal representation "242
"Jail Release - We are attorneys, call us first! All bond
fees apply to attorney fees"
243
Texas Disciplinary Rule 7.03(c) directs that "[a] lawyer, in order
to solicit professional employment, shall not pay, give, advance, or
238. See Timothy J. Miller, Note, The Attorney's Duty to Reveal a Client's Future In-
tended Criminal Conduct, 1984 DUKE L.J. 582, 596 (1984) (detailing the significance of an
attorney keeping his client's secrets to a client's impression of the legal system as being
fair).
239. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.05(b)(4).
240. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.19 (Vernon 2005) (providing the pro-
cess by which a surety releases himself from financial liability and surrenders the principal
to the state). This statute requires the surety to submit an affidavit to the court with juris-
diction in the criminal matter relating the cause for the surrender of the principal. Id. It is
the responsibility of the court to determine from the affidavit that the surety has sufficient
cause to release himself from the financial risk of the bond and deliver the principal back
into custody. Id.
241. See GREATER SAN ANTONIO SOUTHWESTERN BELL YELLOW PAGES 313-14,
§ Bail Bonds (2005) (listing three attorneys' advertisements for bail bond services).
242. See id. at 317 (listing five attorneys advertising bail bond services).
243. Id.
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offer to pay, give, or advance anything of value, other than actual
litigation expenses and other financial assistance as permitted by
Rule 1.08(d), to a prospective client." '244 Advertisements similar to
the ones above pepper both the "Bail Bonds" and "Attorneys" sec-
tions of the Greater San Antonio Southwestern Bell Yellow
Pages.2 45 Although advertising in the yellow pages is a type of per-
missible solicitation under the Rules,2 46 the offers suggested in ad-
vertisements like these pose serious questions of impropriety.
247
244. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 7.03(c).
245. See GREATER SAN ANTONIO SOUTHWESTERN BELL YELLOW PAGES 313-18,
§ Bail Bonds (2005) (advertising sixteen attorneys who provide bail bond services). These
advertisements contain attorney-bail bondsmen offers and enticements that extol the bene-
fits of retaining their services such as: "Why pay twice? Your bond fee goes towards your
legal representation," and "Bond fee applied toward legal fees." Id. In one advertisement,
an attorney-bondsman suggests, "Why pay for a Bondsman when you can get a Lawyer? 'I
will get you out of jail and defend you' -All Bail Bond Fees Apply to Attorney Fees." Id.
It is not uncommon to find advertisements with the promise, "Jail Release - We are attor-
neys, call us first! All bond fees apply to attorney fees," or "Attorney Bail Bonds - Jail
Release 24/7 - All bail bond fees apply to attorney fees - Why pay twice?" and "Bond/
Jail Release - Payment Plans Available." Id.; see also GREATER SAN ANTONIO SOUTH-
WESTERN BELL YELLOW PAGES 105-216, § Attorneys (2005) (advertising thirty-seven at-
torneys who also provide bail bond services). Information provided in these
advertisements includes offers of the following: "Bail Bonds - Bond posting for clients,"
and "Bail Bonds - Free Information - Client's Bonds Posted." Id. One ad features the
phrase, "Locked up?" and offers "24 Hour Service" and "Payment Plans." Id. Significant
attention is given to the service of bail bonding through the use of bold-faced type indicat-
ing, "Criminal Law - Bail Bonds." Id. Another attorney markets the following benefits
to acquiring his representation: "Bail Bond Service - I Write Your Bonds - Bond Fees
Applied to Attorney's Fees." Id.
246. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 7.04(d) (stating that "a lawyer may,
either directly or through a public relations or advertising representative, advertise services
in the public media, such as (but not limited to) a telephone directory, legal directory,
newspaper or other periodical, outdoor display, radio, or television").
247. Cf Fla. State Bar Prof'l Ethics Comm., Op. 72-26 (1972) (reminding attorneys
that "[tjhe Committee has several times advised that a lawyer is not ethically restrained
from engaging in business, if he does not mingle the business with his law practice, either
physically or functionally, and if the business does not operate as a feeder to his law prac-
tice"); see also Kan. Bar Assoc. Ethics-Advisory Comm., Op. 98-12 (1998) (announcing
that "[b]ecause mixing the ads for law services and bonding services leaves the customer
unsure what service the firm may be providing, separate advertising for each business is the
better ethical route"); Ky. Bar Assoc. Ethics Comm., Op. E-82 (1974) (advising that the
problem of indirect solicitation and feeding law practice is best avoided when the attorney
is prohibited from accepting employment from those for whom he executed bonds); accord
N.Y. St. Bar Assoc. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 647 (1993) (declaring that a bail bond
business operated by an attorney "may not be used to solicit clients for the lawyer's law
practice"); Okla. Bar Assoc. Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 36 (1932) (concerning the appear-
ance of improper solicitation of legal business when operating a lay business of furnishing
bonds).
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Texas ethics opinions on the question of an attorney also acting as
his client's bail bondsman date back to the early 1950s, and the
analysis found in many of them focuses on the concern of improper
solicitation.248
While it is true that with the adoption of the Texas Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility and later Texas Disciplinary Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct the terms "indirect solicitation" and "feeder" to
the law practice were abandoned,249 it seems clear that Rule 7.03(c)
continues to concern itself with a means by which an attorney can
improperly solicit business and feed his law practice.2 5 0 Although
historical, the following Texas ethics opinions provide some pearls
of wisdom on the subject that should be reconsidered. Opinion 347
does not assert that acting as bondsman and attorney is per se pro-
hibitive, but it does require the attorney-client relationship to exist
before the signing of the bond. 1 The committee writing this opin-
ion was particularly concerned with the potential for the business
248. See Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 366
(1974) (summarizing former opinions on the topic of the propriety of attorneys "engaging
in the business of making bail bonds" and concluding that the former language, "indirect
solicitation" and "feeder to the law practice," has been abandoned by the disciplinary rules
as being too vague); Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex.,
Op. 347 (1969) (classifying acting as surety as ethical before the attorney-client relationship
has come into existence, but improper after the relationship has formed). This classifica-
tion is based on the concept that an attorney may not use a separate nonlegal service to
solicit business for his law practice. Id.; see also Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of
Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 251 (1952) (regarding an attorney who, by acting as a surety,
does so with the intention to solicit business or "feed" his law practice); cf Comm. on
Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 248 (1962) (opining that it is
improper for an attorney to act as attorney-in-fact for a surety company and use this posi-
tion to solicit business for his criminal practice); Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of
Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 141 (1957) (determining that it is improper under Texas
Canon 24, which governed solicitation before the adoption of Texas's modern rules, to act
as both criminal defense attorney and bail bondsman); Comm. on Interpretation of the
Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 140 (1957) (requiring leave of court before an
attorney may act as a surety in his client's criminal matter because an attorney would oth-
erwise violate the spirit of Canon 24, which governed solicitation in the past).
249. Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 347
(1969).
250. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 7.03(c).
251. Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 347
(1969). It should be noted that the recent amendments to the attorney exemption include
a requirement that an attorney file notice of appearance "at the time the bond is exe-
cuted." TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 1704.163(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2005). This would not
have likely satisfied the 1969 ethics committee as evidence of a relationship existing before
the execution of the bond.
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of acting as surety on criminal bonds to easily become a "feeder to
the attorney's practice of law. ' 252 The committee argues that pro-
viding the service of surety before a attorney-client relationship ex-
ists is analogous to loaning money to an individual to obtain the
individual's case.253 The committee drafting Opinion 251 advances
the position that it is the attorney's motive at the time of the execu-
tion of the bond that matters. 4 For this committee, if the attor-
ney's goal is to obtain subsequent legal work from the individual,
then his motive is tainted and providing the bond is improper.
Like Opinion 347, Opinion 251 emphasizes the significance of the
nature of an existing relationship between the client and the lawyer
in defining the ethical nature of the surety transaction. 5 The com-
mittee believes it is not unethical for an attorney to act as surety
where:
[T]here is a close, pre-existing relationship between the attorney and
client sufficient to indicate clearly that the attorney is not at all moti-
vated by a desire to advertise or to solicit ... this or subsequent legal
work. Such close relationship might include close kinship by consan-
guinity or affinity, a long-term close, personal friendship, or a sub-
stantial, pre-existing, attorney-client relationship. There can be no
merit in saying that, for example, a lawyer cannot himself ethically
bail out his father-in-law, his next-door neighbor, or his main
client. 6
To determine whether offers made in the attorney-bail bonds-
man advertisements violate the Rules, an examination of what ex-
actly is being offered is essential. Basically, the attorney is offering
an alternative to the traditional commercial surety or bail bonds-
man. In other words, the attorney himself is offering to serve as
surety on the bond. A surety is defined as "[a] person who is pri-
252. Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 347
(1969).
253. Id.
254. Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 251
(1962).
255. Id.
256. Id. This position is remarkably similar to the position taken recently by the ABA
in which the ABA rejected a per se prohibition on an attorney acting as a surety, but
instead embraced an approach of limited circumstances when it is appropriate, including
some of the relationships discussed in this Texas opinion. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-432 (2004) (advancing the position that lawyers
should only post bond for their clients in rare circumstances).
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marily liable for the payment of another's debt or the performance
of another's obligation .... A surety differs from a guarantor, who
is liable to the creditor only if the debtor does not meet the duties
owed to the creditor; the surety is directly liable.
257
Thus, the attorney is offering to assume the liability of bail due
to the creditor (the state) based on the terms of the bond, which
require the criminal defendant to appear at all related hearings on
the matter. If the defendant does not appear, the state will collect
and the surety will be responsible for the entire amount of bail.258
The obvious value in the offer is the psychological value of being
free from confinement and the actual financial value associated
with the transaction. Additionally, there is the reality that a surety
of this nature is compensated for the risk in the form of a fee.259
Here, many attorneys sweeten the offer by proposing to apply the
bond fee to the legal fees in the corresponding criminal case.26 °
This implies that if one wants the attorney to post the bond, he
must also be retained as the attorney providing representation in
the criminal matter. This caveat is consistent with the condition in
the attorney exemption statute requiring an attorney who writes a
bond under the exception to also be counsel of record for the de-
fendant in the criminal case.26' Therefore, it seems possible and
even likely that providing bonds is an effective, albeit questionable,
method of building and sustaining a criminal law practice. Adher-
ence to the ABA's position that "the issuance of bail bonds and
matters pertaining thereto are not considered the practice of
257. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1482 (8th ed. 2004).
258. See generally TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 22.01 (Vernon 1989) (providing
statutory authority for the state to take forfeiture of bail when the defendant fails to ap-
pear in any court in which his case is pending); see also Matt Joyce, Lawyer Contests Bond
Tab, WACO TRIBUNE-HERALD, Oct. 29,2005, at lB (covering an attempt by a Waco lawyer
also serving as her client's surety to avoid a $50,000 forfeiture when the client "went
underground").
259. Cf BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1482 (8th ed. 2004) (defining the term "compen-
sated surety" as someone who acts as surety for a fee).
260. See, e.g., GREATER SAN ANTONIO SOUTHWESTERN BELL YELLOW PAGES 317,
§ Bail Bonds (2005) (listing five attorneys advertising bail bond services). In these adver-
tisements, the attorneys solicit business with offers such as: "Jail Release - We are attor-
neys, call us first! - Bail bond fees apply to attorney fees," "Attorney bail bonds &
criminal defense - My bond fee applied towards legal fees," and "Attorney Bail Bonds -
Jail Release 24/7 - All bail bond fees apply to attorney fees - Why pay twice?" Id.
261. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1704.163(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2005).
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law ' 262 makes it simple to conclude that this offer is too good to be
true; it comes with strings attached.
Even so, the attorney-bail bondsman does not have to close shop
just yet. The question remains whether or not this offer of bond
assistance can be saved by the exception in Rule 7.03(c) allowing
attorneys to engage in this transaction if it involves "actual litiga-
tion expenses and other financial assistance as permitted by Rule
1.08(d). ' 263 Rule 1.08 deals with prohibited transactions between a
lawyer and a client and describes in more detail the exceptions re-
ferred to in Rule 7.03(C).2 64 However, it is important to note that
even if it is determined that the cost and interest associated with a
bail bond is a cost of litigation, the attorney would be wise to fol-
low the precautionary measures required in Rule 1.08(a).
D. Prohibited Transactions
Texas Disciplinary Rule 1.08 embraces the traditional principle
that lawyers are forbidden from obtaining a proprietary interest in
the general subject matter of their client's litigation.265 Attorneys
entering into a business transaction with a client must do so "in a
manner which can be reasonably understood by the client" and
where the "terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair
and reasonable. ' 266 The client must also be afforded ample time
"to seek the advice of independent counsel" and the client must
consent to the business transaction in writing.2 67 Rule 1.08 also ad-
dresses the issue of a lawyer providing financial assistance to a cli-
ent in relationship to pending or contemplated litigation.
Generally, an attorney may not provide financial assistance to a
client. However, the Rule provides that "[a] lawyer may advance
or guarantee court costs, expenses of litigation or administrative
proceedings, and reasonably necessary medical and living ex-
penses, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome
of the matter. 2 68 There is no clear answer on whether a bail bond
should be classified as an expense of litigation appropriate for an
262. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1193 (1971).
263. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 7.03(c).
264. Id. 1.08(d).
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attorney to advance to his client, and the jurisdictions addressing
this issue are split. One jurisdiction argues that when a bond is
necessary for litigation to proceed, having a bond issue is in the
client's best interest. 269 But this jurisdiction also cautions that a
prudent lawyer will seek to avoid guaranteeing a large bond.
2
11 Of
course, a criminal defendant does not require a bail bond in order
for her matter to advance to trial, so presumably this jurisdiction
would not consider a bail bond financial assistance covered by the
disciplinary rules. Other jurisdictions reject the notion that a bail
bond is a cost of litigation based solely on their conclusion that
engaging in such a transaction with a client is "contrary to the poli-
cies prohibiting conflicts of interest and solicitation. ' '27 1 However,
at least one jurisdiction believes "bail appears to be close enough
to court-related costs to constitute 'expenses of litigation,' which a
lawyer may properly advance as long as the client remains liable
therefore. '27 2 As discussed, if an attorney is able to successfully
argue his bail bonding service is not improper solicitation because
it is considered a cost of litigation, he would still be wise to meet
the reasonableness and consent requirements of 1.08(a). However,
if he is unable to establish why a bail bond should be considered a
cost of litigation, it could be held that offering this type of service is
an improper solicitation under Rule 7.03.
Despite the importance of making this cost determination, the
more significant inquiry (which one Texas court has examined) re-
garding the prohibitions found in Rule 1.08 is whether the posting
of bond on behalf of a client is a "business transaction" requiring
compliance under the provisions of this Rule. At least one Texas
court has addressed this question and determined it is not. 273 This
269. See Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 1981-55
(1981) (discussing the propriety of an attorney posting a litigation bond for a client); see
also Pa. Bar Assoc. Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 2000-
14 (2000) (considering the propriety of an attorney posting a supersedeas bond in a client's
eviction matter).
270. Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 1981-55
(1981).
271. N.C. St. Bar Assoc. Ethics Comm., Op. RPC 173 (1994); State Bar of Wis.
Comm. on Prof'] Ethics, Op. E-96-1 (1996).
272. Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 2005-4 (2005).
273. See Akridge v. State, 13 S.W.3d 808, 809 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, no pet.)
(holding that a lawyer acting as a surety on an appearance bond is not per se a conflict of
interest).
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conclusion, however, is disputed by Texas ethics opinions on the
subject, an ABA ethics opinion, and a number of ethics opinions
from a variety of states.
In Akridge v. State, 7 a the defendant argued that by serving as
her bondsman, her attorney entered into a business transaction
with her that resulted in a conflict of interest.275 The defendant
asserted that her attorney did not gain her written consent regard-
ing the transaction, and in not doing so failed to comply with Rule
1.08.276 The court rejected her assertion and instead held that "trial
counsel acted as surety on Akridge's bond as part of his legal rep-
resentation of her, not as a separate business transaction. '2 77 The
conclusion of the court here seems curious. When an attorney acts
as a surety it is likely he creates a contract with the client detailing
the conditions under which he will continue to act in this role. For
instance, like a traditional bail bondsman, he may require the client
to report weekly, maintain employment, keep him informed of
changes in address or place of employment, and make payments on
a particular schedule.2 7 8 At first glance these requirements do not
appear too cumbersome, and in fact, could easily be required of an
attorney in the scope of his representation. Yet, there is a signifi-
cant difference between the action an attorney may take if the cli-
ent fails to comply with his terms and the action a bail bondsman
may take under the same set of facts. An attorney may request to
withdraw from representation, leaving the client without a lawyer.
Though certainly inconvenient, this pales in comparison to the al-
ternative. When a bail bondsman is dissatisfied with the defen-
dant's performance on the contract, she may seek to surrender the
bond, placing the client back in jail. Clearly, the court's determina-
tion that the attorney in this case was simply providing an addi-
tional legal service when he posted bond (for a fee) is imprecise at
best. At worst, the court deprived the defendant of her constitu-
tionally protected right to conflict-free counsel when it determined
that her attorney had no competing pecuniary interest during the
274. 13 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, no pet.).
275. Akridge, 13 S.W.3d at 809.
276. Id. at 810.
277. Id.
278. See Telephone Interview with Helen Allred, Owner, A-Tex Bonding Co. (Jan. 5,
2006) (discussing the terms of an appearance bond contract she enters into with each
client).
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litigation of her criminal matter.279  It is likely that the Akridge
court would have come to a different conclusion had they consid-
ered the business of bail bonding through the lens of Rule 1.08.
The first comment to Rule 1.08 explains that the "rule deals with
certain transactions that per se involve unacceptable conflicts of
interests," requiring the attorney in some instances to take precau-
tions to protect the interests of the client.280  Although the rule
does not specifically define "business transaction," it does define
the phrase by exclusion, stating that business transactions do not
include "standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and
the client for products or services that the client generally markets
279. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346 (1980) (holding that unless the conflict is
patent, the trial judge is under no obligation to initiate an inquiry, and on postconviction
attack the defendant is required to demonstrate specifically that an actual conflict ad-
versely affected his lawyer's performance); Akridge v. State, 13 S.W.3d 808, 810 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 2000, no pet.) (applying the Cuyler standard for determining whether an
actual conflict of interest existed which would result in a violation of the Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel). In this case, the criminal defendant attempted to
establish that her attorney acting as her bail bondsman resulted in an actual conflict of
interest. Id. at 809. The court rejected her contention and relied on the fact that her attor-
ney never withdrew the bond, and the court further rejected her argument that she entered
into a plea agreement because of the pressure applied by her attorney to pay her bond and
legal fees. Id. at 810-11. The court concluded that Akridge failed to meet the burden of
establishing an actual conflict, the first prong of the Cuyler test. And in support of this
conclusion, the court stated that "it [cannot] be said that counsel's interest in being paid for
his services adversely affected his performance, as he continued to represent Akridge even
though his fee had not been fully paid." Id. Although the result here could give an attor-
ney-bail bondsman encouragement that his actions would not be deemed a conflict of con-
stitutional proportions, he should be cautious of that conclusion. In fact, what is significant
in this decision is not the outcome, but the court's application of Cuyler, requiring a lower
threshold for a criminal defendant to meet, that of adverse effect, than that of the compet-
ing standard requiring a showing that a Sixth Amendment violation occurs if, but for coun-
sel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 683, 694 (1984); see also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MOD-
ERN LEGAL ETHICS 415 (Hornbook Series Practitioners ed. 1986) (asserting that the
United States Supreme Court "has uniformly condemned representations in which the
[criminal] defense lawyer operates under a conflict of interest"). Wolfram further explains
that if the conflict is "blatant and substantial," the accused is permitted to attack the con-
viction in subsequent proceedings even if the defendant was silent at the time. Id. But see
Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1260 (5th Cir. 1995) (limiting the application of the Cuyler
standard to those special cases of attorney conflicts that arise in cases involving multiple
client representation).
280. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.08 cmt. 1.
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to others."28 ' The reasons for excluding these transactions from
the restrictions of the rule provides a clue as to what evil Rule 1.08
intends to prevent, and also assists in developing the scope of the
term "business transaction." In explaining the purpose of this ex-
clusion, comment 2 provides that "[i]n such transactions, the law-
yer has no advantage in dealing with the client, and the restrictions
... are unnecessary and impracticable. '282 Therefore, it reasonably
follows that Rule 1.08 is concerned with transactions between a
lawyer and his client where the lawyer has an advantage over his
client in the dealing. Rule 1.08(h) further develops the scope of
the term "business transaction" with its requirement that "[a] law-
yer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or
subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client,"
with the exception that the lawyer may seek a judicial lien to se-
cure his unpaid fees or enter into a contingent fee arrangement in
certain civil matters.283
In stark contrast to the Akridge court's conclusion that providing
bonding services is not a separate business transaction between an
attorney and his client requiring written informed consent, Texas
ethics opinion 366 addresses the practice as a "second business or
profession, ' '2 84 and Texas ethics opinion 388 states:
When an attorney personally executes a bail bond for and on be-
half of a client accused of a crime, he, at such time ... [has] ... [o]n
the one hand ... [established] ... the attorney-client relationship...
and on the other hand ... has involved himself in a 'business rela-
tionship' with the client and an overriding obligation to the Court. 85
These opinions are particularly important given the timing of
their release. Both opinions represent the last words spoken on
this issue in Texas from an ethics perspective and each was released
after the attorney exemption was codified in 1973. In other words,
no significant changes have occurred involving this practice to
281. See id. 1.08 cmt. 2 (identifying transactions such as banking or brokerage ser-
vices, medical services, products manufactured or distributed by the client or utility ser-
vices as examples).
282. Id.
283. Id. 1.08(h) cmt. 7.
284. Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 366
(1974).
285. Comm. on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 388
(1977).
[Vol. 37:933
ATTORNEYS AS BAIL BONDSMEN
render the positions expressed in these opinions invalid or inappli-
cable. As further support that bail bonding is indeed a "second
profession," one must only review the Texas statutory regulations
governing all those who provide bail bond services for a premium
(including attorneys) 286 and the ABA's contention that "[g]enerally
speaking, the issuance of bail bond and matters pertaining thereto
are not considered the practice of law. There are many nonlawyers
engaged in the bail bond business. "287 The ABA clearly considers
bail bonding a non-legal service, albeit a service that attorneys in
Texas may choose to offer. However, the provision of this service
should be considered separate from the legal representation.
The California State Bar addressed the lawyer's ethical responsi-
bilities when rendering non-legal services to a client that are either
offered outside the scope of legal representation, or connected
with the lawyer's representation of the client. The position taken
in this ethics opinion is that "[t]he provision of non-legal services to
a client... is a business transaction subject to [the comparable rule
to Texas Rule 1.08]."288 Similarly, the Colorado Bar Association,
in dealing with the ethical propriety of lawyers practicing law and
concurrently participating in a second occupation, strongly discour-
ages lawyers from acting in another business capacity in the same
transaction. The opinion cautions that "[s]ome dual occupation
transactions are so fraught with ethical risk that the
[c]ommittee discourages them even with the informed consent of
the client." '89 Moreover, several jurisdictions dealing directly with
the question of lawyer-bail bondsmen in their ethics opinions label
the provision of bail bonding services as a business transaction that
is wholly distinct from the legal services unique to the attorney-
client relationship.2 90 The Kansas Bar Association (KBA) directly
286. See generally TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. §§ 1704.001-306 (Vernon 2004 & Supp.
2005) (providing all the regulations applicable to licensed bail bondsmen and attorneys
acting under the exemption).
287. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1193 (1971).
288. Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 1995-141
(1995).
289. Colo. Bar Assoc. Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 98 (1996).
290. See Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 1981-55
(1981) (requiring written consent from the client when an attorney acts as his client's
surety); see also Kan. Bar Assoc. Ethics-Advisory Comm., Op. 98-12 (1998) (indicating the
committee's conclusion that "bail bonding, when performed by a lawyer in the active prac-
tice of law, is an ancillary business," and that "[t]he purchase of a bail bond from lawyer
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answers the central inquiry pondered and answered poorly by the
Akridge court when it opined, "[t]he purchase of a bail bond from
a lawyer who also represents the client is a business transaction.
Full disclosure is required if the attorney is to avoid conflicts of
interest."291 The Akridge court would have likely reached a differ-
ent (and more correct) conclusion had it considered KBA's conten-
tion and struggled with the conclusion of the KBA on this matter.
Following the determination that a business transaction has oc-
curred requiring full disclosure and client consent, the KBA deter-
mines that "a bail bond is purchased by one accused of a crime,
[and because] [s]uch persons are especially vulnerable . . . [they]
ordinarily will not be in a position to give informed consent.
292
The Virginia Bar Association (VBA) takes a similar view that
"[d]isclosure and consent cannot cure the conflict between the law-
yer's duty as an advocate and his own interest in avoiding forfei-
ture should the client fail to appear in court. 2 93 But the VBA
speaks with an even stronger voice on the topic and declares that
"this type of business transaction with a client might easily be
viewed as unconscionable, unfair, or inequitable. 2 94 This position
seems to strike at the very heart of why our rules of professional
conduct require attorneys to carefully evaluate their dealings with
clients and classify some business transactions as utterly prohibited.
In making the decision to act as a lawyer-bail bondsman, a Texas
attorney should consider the bargaining position the transaction
gives him in relation to his client. One of the few Texas cases ad-
dressing the disciplinary rule on business transactions with a client
embraced the position that "[b]usiness relationships between law-
yers and clients are beset with conflicts of interest and will often
involve situations in which the lawyer occupies a dangerously supe-
who also represents the client is a business transaction"); State Bar of Mich. Comm. on
Prof'l and Judicial Ethics, Informal Op. RI-65 (1990) (discussing the propriety of an attor-
ney entering into a business transaction with the client for the attorney to act as surety);
Va. Opinion 1343, [1986-1990 Transfer Binder] Lawyers' Manual on Prof'I Conduct (ABA/
BNA) § 901:8771 (1990) (recognizing the service of bail bonding as a separate business
transaction between lawyer and client).
291. Kan. Bar Assoc. Ethics-Advisory Comm., Op. 98-12 (1998).
292. Id.
293. Va. Opinion 1343, [1986-1990 Transfer Binder] Lawyers' Manual on Prof'l Con-
duct (ABA/BNA) § 901:8771 (1990).
294. Id.
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rior bargaining position." '295 It is difficult to conjure a more dan-
gerously superior position than that of one held by an individual
who has the complete authority to pluck you from a free life and
place you back behind bars. An attorney-bail bondsman should
proceed with caution understanding that a lawyer may not deal
with a client at arm's length, treating her as a stranger. Indeed, the
law imposes a fiduciary standard that is demanding of attorneys
and often forgiving of clients. In State Bar of Texas v. Dolenz, 96
the court applied the common law rules governing transactions be-
tween fiduciaries and their clients. The court held that "because of
the[ ] lawyer's presumed superior professional knowledge and skill
.... [t]he strict scrutiny standard applies to all business dealings
between lawyer and client. '2 97 Basically, the common law doctrine
of strict scrutiny provides that a client who challenges the validity
of a business transaction with a lawyer is required only to show
that the disadvantageous transaction was entered into with her at-
torney.98 The burden then shifts and requires the attorney to
prove that he did not take advantage of the relationship with his
client.2 99 At the very least, an attorney would be expected to prove
the existence and extent of the disclosure to his client, which is
mandated by Rule 1.08(a). 300 However, it is also possible that a
court could agree with the position taken by many other jurisdic-
tions and hold that this type of business transaction is completely
prohibited and both violates the disciplinary rules and breaches the
fiduciary relationship an attorney has with his client, especially
when an unscrupulous attorney is acting as his client's bail bonds-
man. This represents a risky business for both the attorney and his
criminal defendant client.
295. State Bar of Tex. v. Dolenz, 3 S.W.3d 260, 265 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.)
(citing CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 479 (Hornbook Series Practition-
ers ed. 1986)).
296. 3 S.W.3d 260 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.).
297. Dolenz, 3 S.W.3d at 266.
298. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 481 (Hornbook Series Practi-
tioners ed. 1986).
299. Id.
300. See Dolenz, 3 S.W.3d at 268 (requiring an attorney to prove his client "consented
to the transaction after full disclosure").
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VIII. RIGHTING THE WRONG: REPERCUSSIONS FOR THE
ATTORNEY BONDSMAN
A client whose attorney-bail bondsman has jumped off her bond
without reasonable cause, causing her to be rearrested and jailed,
has few options to redress the wrong. Her immediate concern may
be to be released from jail to await her trial. She would then need
to seek a new bail bondsman, pay that bondsman another fee or
premium, and once released seek to pursue one or more of the
following remedies available in Texas. However, she may also be
seeking a modicum of, as she may see it, justice against her attor-
ney bondsman whom she will deem has put her in a bad position.
Attorneys should consider the types of redress the client may seek
when considering whether to jump off the bond.
A. Complain to County Bail Bond Board
A client may seek to file a complaint against her attorney-bail
bondsman with the Bail Bond Board of her county.3 °1 The process
is initiated by the client completing an affidavit detailing the spe-
cific facts and allegations concerning the alleged misconduct of her
bondsman.302 After a subsequent investigation by the board, which
can include a hearing where both the bondsman and client testify,
it will reach a determination as to whether the bondsman acted
appropriately.3 °3 If the board determines that the bondsman acted
inappropriately, it will then determine what can be done by the
bondsman to remedy the situation.30 4 If there is a remedy, the
board will provide the attorney-bondsman sufficient time to repair
301. See generally Tarrant County Bail Bond Rules & Regulations: Complaints/Hear-
ings, http://www.tarrentcounty.com/esheriff/cwp/view.asp?A=785&Q=436180 (last visited
Feb. 23, 2006) (detailing the process for filing a complaint through hearing phase) (on file
with the St. Mary's Law Journal). Some counties do not have a bail bond board. In those
situations, a complaint may be filed against the bail bondsman through the sheriff's
department.
302. See id. (providing that the district attorney's office shall advise the bail bond
board whether a complaint received by the board states probable cause).
303. See id. (indicating that the bail bond board may hear testimony and must send
written notice to the parties of its decision); Price v. Carpenter, 758 F. Supp. 403, 409 (N.D.
Tex. 1991) (holding that an attorney-bail bondsman's due process rights were not violated
after a hearing was held wherein her attorney exemption was revoked).
304. See TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 1704.163(b) (Vernon Supp. 2005) (providing that an
attorney, after committing a violation, may be barred from acting as a bail bondsman until
he has remedied the violation).
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the damage his actions have caused, during which time the board
shall order the Sheriff of that county to suspend the attorney's
power to make bonds under the "attorney exception" pursuant to
Section 1704.163(b) of the Texas Occupations Code.3"5 Misconduct
on behalf of a bail bondsman can impair or prevent his ability to
renew his license, or in the case of an attorney, qualify his ability to
remain a bondsman pursuant to the attorney exception provided
by statute. Moreover, if there has been misconduct on the part of
the attorney bail bondsman, the board reserves the right to refer
the misconduct to the State Bar of Texas Grievance Committee.
B. Complain to the State Bar of Texas
The client can, independent of the Bail Bond Board, file a com-
plaint against her attorney-bail bondsman with the State Bar of
Texas Grievance Committee. The grievance committee can review
allegations of attorney misconduct, that is, whether the attorney in
his representation has violated either the Rules of Professional
Conduct or the Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.3 °6 The committee
does not have the authority to review allegations of attorney mal-
practice.30 7 Similar to a complaint filed with the Bail Bond Board,
to initiate a grievance the client must complete a form which asks
for the specific facts and allegations surrounding the complaint. 30
After the grievance committee receives the complaint form, it will
conduct its own investigation, the results of which can either pro-
ceed to a grievance panel for disposition or be used to bring an
action against the attorney through litigation. 30 9 This remedy may
not provide the client with anything other than a sense of satisfac-
tion that her attorney has been reprimanded and next time may
305. See id. (providing that an attorney-bail bondsman's license that has been sus-
pended due to a violation may stay suspended until he has remedied that violation).
306. See State Bar of Texas, Client Assistance and Grievance, www.texasbar.com/
Template.cfm?Section=ClientAttorneyAssistance&CONTENTID=3367&TEMPLATE
=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited Feb. 23, 2006) (commenting that
"[a]llegations of misconduct by an attorney are very serious, and are reviewed by the Chief
Disciplinary Counsel") (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal).
307. See id. (indicating that malpractice by an attorney may be committed without
violating the disciplinary rules, and that competent advice should be sought by clients to
decide what remedies are available to them).
308. See id. (stating that the "[flirst step in filing a grievance is to complete a grievance
form and mail it to the State Disciplinary Counsel's office").
309. Id.
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give serious consideration to his motivation before he jumps off a
client's bond. For an attorney, however, any referral to the Griev-
ance Committee should invoke a fear that he may be reprimanded,
and depending on the nature, severity, and rate of occurrence may
ultimately face disbarment.
C. Contest the Surrender of the Bond
In addition, the client may seek to contest her surrender which
was authorized by the court after it reviewed the affidavit of sur-
render filed by the bail bondsman.31 ° The reviewing court must be
the same court which issued the warrant for arrest or capias.311 In
some counties, this is the same court in which the underlying crimi-
nal action is pending. In the affidavit for surrender, the attorney-
bail bondsman must allege facts establishing cause to surrender the
principal and establishing that she should be recaptured and re-
turned to the custody of the state.312 Both the Texas Occupations
Code and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure require that a
court find cause to grant the arrest warrant or capias.313 If a client
is contesting the affidavit, she must prove that it did not allege
"reasonable" cause, thereby requiring a higher burden of proof for
her attorney to meet at that stage.31 4 If she prevails in the contest,
she is eligible to receive a refund of her bond premium or fee, or
can possibly receive even a higher amount.31 5 This may be a shal-
low victory since she will need that money to give to another bail
bondsman in order to secure another bond to be released from jail
to await her trial. Moreover, she may not be able to hire another
310. See TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 1704.207 (Vernon 2004) (authorizing a bail bonds-
man to surrender the principal under certain circumstances).
311. Id. § 1704.207(b).
312. See id. § 1704.207(a)(2)(A)-(G) (listing the requirements for the affidavit of
surrender).
313. See id. § 1704.207(b) (implying that the court must find reasonable cause to allow
for the principal to be surrendered by providing penalties against the bail bondsman if it is
later found that reasonable cause did not exist).
314. See id. (allowing the surrender of the principal to be challenged if "the principal
of the attorney representing the state or an accused in the case determines that a reason for
the surrender was without reasonable cause").
315. See TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 1704.207(c) (Vernon 2004) (authorizing a court
which finds that the surrender was without reasonable cause to award the principal "all or
part of the fees paid for the execution of the bond," and "the fees paid to induce the
person to execute the bond regardless of whether the fees are described as fees for execu-
tion of the bond").
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attorney to represent her at trial and will need to remain with the
attorney against whom she obtained a money judgment, and whose
ability or desire to zealously advocate for her may not be what it
was at the beginning of the representation. Nonetheless, if the cli-
ent were to take this approach, the attorney-bondsman would have
to justify himself before the judge who granted the warrant for ar-
rest, and if the judge finds that the attorney inappropriately
jumped off the bond, he risks his reputation before that or other
judges. Further, the attorney-bail bondsman may also have to re-
fund the bail bond premium or fee, thereby causing a financial loss
for the attorney.
D. File a Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim
Finally, a client who believes her attorney improperly jumped off
her bond may file a civil action in court against him for breach of
fiduciary duty and seek monetary damages. The attorney-client re-
lationship "is characterized as 'highly fiduciary,' and requires proof
of 'perfect fairness' on the part of the attorney. ' '31 6 Therefore, the
attorney owes his client a higher duty in his representation of her.
In fact, the attorney-client relationship is one of "'most abundant
good faith,' requiring absolute and perfect candor, openness and
honesty, and the absence of any concealment or deception.5
317
The focus of a breach of fiduciary duty action is "whether an attor-
ney obtained an improper benefit from representing a client.
' 318
This can occur by an "attorney's failure to disclose conflicts of in-
terest, failure to deliver funds belonging to the client,. . . improper
use of client confidences,... [or] engaging in self-dealing. ' 319 An
attorney has an "affirmative duty to make a full and accurate con-
fession of all his fiduciary activities, transactions, profits and mis-
takes. ' 320 Consequently, failure to do so may leave him liable in a
316. Jackson Law Office, P.C. v. Chappell, 37 S.W.3d 15, 22 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2000,
pet. denied) (citing Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735, 739 (Tex. 1965)).
317. Perez v. Kirk, 822 S.W.2d 261, 265 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied)
(citing Hefner v. State, 735 S.W.2d 608, 624 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, pet. ref'd)).
318. Aiken v. Hancock, 115 S.W.3d 26, 28 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, pet. de-
nied) (citing Kimleco Petroleum, Inc. v. Morrison & Shelton, 91 S.W.3d 921, 923 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied)).
319. Goffney v. Rabson, 56 S.W.3d 186, 193 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001,
pet. denied).
320. Jackson, 37 S.W.3d at 22.
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breach of fiduciary duty action, particularly if the court finds that
the attorney intentionally concealed any information. In Jackson
Law Office, P.C. v. Chappell,321 the Twelfth Court of Appeals as-
serted that the "breach of the duty of full disclosure by a fiduciary
is tantamount to fraudulent concealment. 3 22 If the client alleges
that her attorney jumped off her bond, and in doing so was moti-
vated by his own financial interests, the court may consider that the
attorney was self-dealing, which implies a presumption of unfair-
ness in favor of the client.323 Once an allegation of self-dealing is
raised, the burden of proof then shifts to the attorney to prove:
"(a) that the questioned transaction was made in good faith, (b) for
a fair consideration, and (c) after full and complete disclosure of all
material information to the principal. ' 324 While there are various
remedies for a client seeking redress against her attorney-bail
bondsman, they are oftentimes of little comfort because the greater
harm of the client being incarcerated and potentially placed at a
disadvantage for her trial far outweigh any restitution the client
could receive. Of course, this could pose the biggest inconvenience
for an attorney now that he is a named defendant in a suit for mon-
etary damages, which if the court deems the attorney's conduct suf-
ficiently egregious, could also render the court's sua sponte referral
to the State Bar of Texas Grievance Committee.
IX. RECOMMENDATION
In his oft-cited treatise on professional responsibility and legal
ethics, Professor C. Wolfram clearly asserts that "[i]n the course of
representing a client, incidental matters might arise such as the cli-
ent's need for a surety .... A lawyer serving or having an interest
in [that] business is obviously in a conflict of interest with his or her
client. '3 25 Apparently, this conflict is not so obvious to the State of
Texas. However, outside of the circle of attorneys who market the
service of bail bonds to criminal defendants, it is difficult to find
321. 37 S.W.3d 15 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2000, pet. denied).
322. Jackson, 37 S.W.3d at 22 (citing Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex.
1988)).
323. Id.
324. Id. (citing Stephens County Museum, Inc. v. Swenson, 517 S.W.2d 257, 261 (Tex.
1974)).
325. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 483 (Hornbook Series Practi-
tioners ed. 1986) (emphasis added).
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anyone who disagrees with the authors on this topic. In fact, the
most common response to this dual practice is, "an attorney can do
that?" Most are stunned to learn that not only can an attorney act
in this capacity for his client, but also that the Occupation Code
carves out a statutory exemption to enable and facilitate it. It is
refreshing to find legal ethicists, the majority of states, and even
the ABA call a spade a spade by addressing the obvious conflict in
such a direct manner. It is now time for Texas to do the same.
And, fortunately for Texans, there are a variety of options to con-
sider and from which to select.
Undoubtedly, the most comprehensive and protective approach
parallels one taken by many states-that of a statutory prohibi-
tion.326 While some states prohibit the attorney from acting as a
bail bondsman and impose a criminal sanction for violation of that
provision,32 others have a more measured response and specifi-
cally prohibit an attorney from becoming a surety for his own cli-
ents.328 The latter approach is the superior approach for Texas to
take at this time.
Given the history of the practice of attorney-bail bonding in
Texas, it seems unrealistic to pursue an enactment of a complete
prohibition. Many attorneys have come to rely on the income as-
sociated with the bail bond business and Texas does not discourage
attorneys from engaging in ancillary occupations; therefore, al-
lowing attorneys to compete for a percentage of the available bail
bond business seems fair while keeping with the free-market sys-
326. See cases cited supra note 78.
327. See GA. CODE ANN. § 45-11-8(a) (Supp. 2005) ("It shall be unlawful for any
elected official, officer of the court, law enforcement officer, or attorney in this state to
engage either directly or indirectly in the bail bond business."). Section 45-11-8(b) of the
Georgia code also states that "[a]ny person who violates this Code section shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor." Id. § 45-11-8(b). N.Y. INS. LAW § 6804(c) (McKinney 2005) ("Any mem-
ber of the bar having any financial interest by which he is to profit from the giving of bail
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.").
328. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-67 (West 2001) ("No attorney-at-law may give
any bond or recognizance in any criminal action or proceeding in which he is interested as
attorney."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 454.20 (West 2001) ("No attorney shall become surety on
the official bond of any state, county, or municipal officer of this state, nor surety on any
bond of a client in judicial proceedings."); see also MICH. CoMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2665
(LexisNexis 2004) (providing that "[n]o practicing attorney or counselor shall become a
surety or post a bond for any client," but that the rule "shall not apply to any bond of
$100.00 or less required to be filed by a fiduciary in the probate court or the family division
of circuit court").
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tem embraced in the United States. This Article does not address
the larger issue of the implications and equity of the bail bond sys-
tem on criminal defendants; rather, this Article addresses the sanc-
tity of the attorney-client relationship and the tarnishing of that
relationship, as well as the profession, when an attorney acts as his
client's bail bondsman. Therefore, we recommend that Texas re-
peal the attorney exemption and enact a statute that prohibits an
attorney from acting as a bail bondsman for his own clients. With
this approach, lawyers will be free to engage in the business of bail
bonding with non-clients, subject to the licensing, security, and reg-
ulatory requirements of the Occupation Code; clients will be pro-
tected from the harm of the transaction; and the profession of
lawyering will stand taller because we chose to respect the delicate
nature and profound responsibility of the attorney-client
relationship.
X. CONCLUSION
In the meantime, there remain myriad ethical considerations an
attorney must carefully consider when determining whether to be-
come a bail bondsman for his criminal defendant client. It is not
enough for an attorney to rely solely on Texas statutes and ethics
opinions to resolve the quandary, because they do little in regards
to providing a proper analysis of the ethical duties he owes his cli-
ent. With his heightened fiduciary duty to his clients, it should not
be enough that he is doing the minimum to ensure he is not de jure
violating his duties, but rather, he should focus on whether in effect
he is de facto violating his duties. He should also look to other
states' opinions and other resources available. He must maintain
the highest professional integrity if he is to do right by his clients
and ensure an unquestionable dedication to both the letter and
spirit of the law.
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